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to Afghanistan’s revanchist claim made about Pakistan’s western province and its non-
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interfered in each other’s domestic affairs. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan forced 
Pakistan to wage a proxy war in Afghanistan, garnering the support of Western and Arab 
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through support of Taliban. Its prime security interest in Afghanistan remains having a 
friendly government in Kabul.  
After the September 11, 2001 attacks, Pakistan abandoned support of Taliban and 
joined the U.S.-led coalition to destroy the Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Once again, 
Pakistan encountered a deep-seated hostility, this time from the Northern Alliance, which 
dominates the new power structure in Kabul. Skepticism and fear remain as both 
countries move cautiously to revitalize bilateral ties. 
This thesis analyzes Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy from 1947 to 2001. It 
recommends Pakistan’s effective engagement with Afghanistan. While Pakistan protects 
its legitimate security interests, it must refrain from actively interfering in Afghanistan’s 
political future. The thesis will also recommends that the United States should 
substantively remain engaged in Afghanistan to stabilize the region, assist with the 
reconstruction of Afghanistan, ensure non interference of regional actors, and finally and 

































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii




A. BACKGROUND ..............................................................................................2 
1. First Period (1947 to 1979) -From Pakistan’s Independence to 
Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan ...........................................................3 
2. Second Period (1979-1989)- Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan ...........4 
3. Third Period (1989 to 2001) – From the Soviet Withdrawal to 
the Fall of the Taliban..........................................................................4 
B. CHAPTER OUTLINE.....................................................................................7 
II. PAKISTAN’S AFGHANISTAN POLICY - 1947 TO 1979 .....................................9 
A. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................9 
B. PAKISTAN’S SECURITY CONSTRAINTS..............................................10 
1. Pakistan’s Apprehensions Towards India .......................................11 
2. Afghanistan’s Reservations towards Pakistan ................................12 
3. Perspective on the Indo-Afghan Nexus ............................................13 
C. THE ISSUES: THE DURAND LINE AND PUSHTUNISTAN ................13 
1. The Durand Line Issue ......................................................................13 
a. Afghanistan’s Point of View...................................................16 
b. Pakistan’s Point of View.........................................................16 
2. The Pushtunistan Issue......................................................................17 
a. Pakistan’s Point of View.........................................................17 
D. PAKISTAN’S STRATEGY ..........................................................................19 
E. PAKSITAN-AFGHANISTAN RELATIONS .............................................19 
F. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................24 
III. PAKISTAN’S AFGHANISTAN POLICY AFTER THE SOVIET 
INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN-1979 TO 1989 ...................................................27 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................27 
B. SOVIET MOTIVATIONS: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND..................29 
C. THREAT PERCEPTION: GLOBAL AND REGIONAL .........................31 
1. Impact on Pakistan ............................................................................32 
2. The Response of the International Community ..............................33 
D. POLICY OPTIONS FOR PAKISTAN........................................................33 
E. THE ISLAMISTS MOVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN.............................35 
F. PAKISTAN’S STRATEGY ..........................................................................37 
1. Pakistan’s Diplomatic Efforts...........................................................39 
G. ANALYSIS OF GENEVA ACCORD ..........................................................39 
1. Formation of Interim Government ..................................................40 
2. Continuation of Arms Support .........................................................41 
3. Mujahideen’s Participation...............................................................41 
H. RESPONSE TO GENEVA ACCORD.........................................................42 
I. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................43 
 viii
IV. PAKISTAN’S AFGHANISTAN POLICY: POST SOVIET 
WITHDRAWAL-1989 TO 2001...............................................................................45 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................45 
B. POST SOVIET WITHDRAWAL PERIOD................................................46 
1. Phase I (1989 to 1992): The Mujahideen Struggle to Remove 
Najibullah’s Regime...........................................................................46 
2. Phase II (1992–94) Mujahideen’s Struggle for Power....................48 
3. Phase III (1994 To 2001) the Taliban Regime.................................51 
C. PAKISTAN’S GOALS AND STRATEGIES ..............................................51 
1. Pakistan’s Support of the Taliban....................................................52 
D. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY’S REACTION AND THE 
FALL OF THE TALIBAN............................................................................54 
E. THE UNITED STATES’ TALIBAN POLICY ...........................................56 
F. ANALYSIS OF PAKISTAN’S AFGHAN POLICY...................................57 
1. Flaws in Pakistan’s Afghan Policy ...................................................58 
2. Contributory Factors.........................................................................60 
3. Implications for Pakistan ..................................................................61 
G.  CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................62 
V. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................65 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................65 
B AFGHANISTAN’S PRESENT GEO-STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT ..66 
1. Afghanistan’s Internal Situation ......................................................66 
2. The Global and Regional Scenario...................................................67 
C. CONVERGING FACTORS IN PAKISTAN-AFGHANSITAN 
RELATIONS..................................................................................................68 
D. CURRENT FACTORS IN PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN 
RELATIONS..................................................................................................70 
1. Terrorism............................................................................................70 
2. Economic Dimension – The Route to Central Asia.........................71 
3. The United States’ Presence in Afghanistan ...................................72 
E. AFGHANISTAN’S POLICY OPTIONS.....................................................72 
F. PAKISTAN’S POLICY OPTIONS..............................................................73 
1. Coercive Diplomacy...........................................................................73 
2. Policy of Reassurance ........................................................................75 
G. RECOMMENDATIONS...............................................................................76 
H. SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE UNITED STATES..........78 
I. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................78 
APPENDIX.............................................................................................................................81 
BIBLIOGRAPHY..................................................................................................................83 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................87 
 ix





































I have to thank many. First of all I would like to thank Professor Peter Lavoy for 
his continues help and guidance in completing this thesis. With him it has been lot easier 
and a lot more fun. Professor Jeff Knoff’s explanation of influence theories in state to 
state relations contributed much in formulating future policy options for Pakistan with 
regards to Afghanistan. I am also thankful to my editor Martin for making my sentences 
more meaningful. Special thanks to school librarians who provided all the material and 
resources for the completion of the thesis. Above all, I have to thank Brigadier (retd) 
Feroz Khan who taught me a huge amount and has provided unfailing support. His 
knowledge of contemporary Afghan history, news judgment, and understanding of South 
Asian politics are without equal. 
I also would like to express my gratitude to my wife Farah who has shown 

























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
1 
                                                
I. INTRODUCTION  
 
 
Following the events of September 11, 2001, the political landscape of South Asia 
transformed dramatically. Consequently, Pakistan’s strategy changed radically when its 
decade old “forward policy” in Afghanistan became counter-productive to its own 
national security. Pakistan’s reversal of Afghan policy was not without repercussions. 
Pakistan continues to face serious political, economic and security challenges. Its 
complex security problems with India, as well as serious domestic issues, remain 
Pakistan’s primary concern. Its relations with Afghanistan continue to be bedeviled with 
skepticism and fear, even as both countries are cautiously revitalizing bilateral relations. 
Historically, Pakistan’s policy towards Afghanistan has remained a highly controversial 
topic. It is, therefore, important to evaluate the causes, and, thereby, determine why 
Pakistan’s policy objectives in Afghanistan have been so difficult to achieve. 
This thesis will analyze the dynamics of Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan 
from 1947 to 2001. The analysis here will describe the extent to which Pakistan’s 
previous Afghan policy has served Pakistan’s national interests. Given such a historical 
perspective, policy-makers may be able to better analyze the ramifications of both current 
and future policies. 
The nature of Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan has been predominantly 
shaped by Pakistan’s desire to have friendly relations with Afghanistan. The creation of 
such an environment allows Pakistan not to be sandwiched between two hostile neighbors 
--India to the east and Afghanistan to the west. Afghanistan’s refusal to accept the 
historically set border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, also known as the Durand 
Line,1 as the legitimately recognized international border between them, has been the root 
problem since 1947. Additionally, Afghanistan also laid territorial claims on the north-
 
1 The Durand Line, marking the Eastern most boundary of Afghanistan, was established as a result of 
the treaty signed by the government of British India and Afghanistan’s Amir at the end of the 19th century. 
In 1947, when Pakistan was first created, Afghanistan refused to accept the Durand Line as an international 
border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. For details see Chapter II. 
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west frontier provinces of Pakistan on a nationalistic basis-- the so-called Pushtunistan.2 
The ruling elites in Afghanistan, while pressing their revanchist claim, followed an open, 
pro-Indian posture, despite being aware of the nature of India`s threat to Pakistan. This 
only served to reinforce Islamabad’s belief that Afghanistan is a secondary threat to 
Pakistan, and is prepared to serve interests of powers hostile to Pakistan’s security—
Soviet Union and India. 
Pakistan’s fundamental aim has been to stabilize its western borders. It became 
acute because of India’s hostile posture, compelling Pakistan, to seek defensive measures. 
India’s threat remains central and primary to Pakistani security calculation with 
Afghanistan, as well. Pakistani policy-makers were so focused on a joint Indo-Afghan 
threat perception that they were unable to fully appreciate the changing geo-political 
dynamics in the after math of the collapse of the Soviet Union. It was with this back drop 
that Pakistan followed an active forward policy in the 1990s in Afghanistan, eventually 
situation got out of its hand. 
A. BACKGROUND 
Afghanistan is one of Pakistan’s most strategically important neighbors. From a 
geo-political standpoint, Afghanistan’s location at the crossroads of south and central 
Asia has always been critical. In the early 20th century, the famous Indian poet, 
Muhammad Iqbal, described Afghanistan as “the heart of Asia,” while India’s viceroy, 
Lord Curzon, called it the “cockpit of Asia”.3 Throughout its history under Britain, it was 
a buffer against Czarist Russia’s expansion that stopped in Central Asia at River Oxus. 
The post independence significance of Afghanistan continued, as the Cold War set in, 
which brought super power rivalry and complicated Pakistan- Afghanistan relations.  
With its inception in 1947, Pakistan inherited a unique and difficult security 
situation. The new-born state was thrown into the international current before it could 
stand on its own two feet. Its antagonistic relationship with India, several times its size, 
when combined with an unfriendly Afghanistan, increased Pakistani insecurity. Though 
 
2 The Pushtunistan issue is closely linked with the Durand Line in creating a troublesome tribal 
boundary, dividing the Pushtuns between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Afghanistan, following the argument 
that the Durand Line was accepted under pressure, contends that Pushtuns living on the Pakistan side 
should be given autonomy because they were forcefully divided. For details. see Chapter II. 
3 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban (London: Yale University Press, 2001), 7. 
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militarily, India was a greater threat to Pakistan than Afghanistan, Pakistan could not 
afford to ignore Afghanistan’s role in creating malfeasance on its western border.  
Given this security environment, Pakistan looked towards Afghanistan as a 
potential friend in the region. Realizing that landlocked Afghanistan was economically 
dependent on Pakistan, and given that both countries are Muslim, Pakistan assumed that 
Afghanistan will be a natural friend, give up its unrealistic territorial claims and maintain 
friendly, cordial and mutually beneficial relations. However, during the last five decades, 
the relations between both the countries never ran a smooth course. 
For the purpose of analysis, the period from 1947 to 2001 has been divided into 
three major periods in Pakistan’s Afghanistan relations, each marked by a change in the 
geo-political situation in Afghanistan. Accordingly, 1947 to 1979 is considered as the 
first period; 1979 to 1989 delimits the second period; and 1989 to 2001 the third period. 
Although, there have been many constants in Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy, priorities 
have frequently been altered in accordance with the changing geo-political situation of 
Afghanistan, in order to best promote Pakistani national objectives. The reader does well 
to note that there was a visible transition in Pakistan policy from Pakistan’s desire to have 
friendly relations with the Afghanistan government during the first period, to ambitious 
aspirations to establish a friendly government in Afghanistan. 
1. First Period (1947 to 1979) -From Pakistan’s Independence to Soviet 
Invasion of Afghanistan 
From 1947 to 1979, the issues presented by the Durand Line and Pushtunistan 
remained the major concerns for Pakistan’s foreign policy and spoiled the relations 
between the two countries during the following decades. Afghanistan was the only 
country not to vote in favor of the admission of Pakistan in the UN. Consequently, due to 
antagonistic relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan, the Soviet Union was quick to 
expand its influence in Afghanistan. The other important factor in Pakistan-Afghan 
relations was the latter’s good relations with India. Further, the Indo-Soviet strategic 
alliance added to Pakistan’s perception that a threat existed. The actual problem was that 
Pakistan became a direct and an indirect target of the nexus created by Indo-Soviet-
Afghan relations. Pakistan, being a newly born country, had virtually no army with which 
to defend its frontiers and, thus, could certainly not afford to fight a war on two fronts. 
4 
Consequently, Pakistan adopted a defensive policy, vis-à-vis Afghanistan, in order to 
ensure that a friendly regime arose in Afghanistan; one which would help it to stabilize 
its western borders.  
During this period, Pakistan did not have a comprehensive Afghan policy. Rather, 
Pakistan had a policy in which it simply reacted to Afghanistan’s actions. By regularly 
closing its borders and granting asylum to Islamist leaders after the Daoud coup in 1973 
(against King Zahir Shah), Pakistan did try indirectly to influence the Afghanistan 
government. Overall, Pakistan was able to maintain the status quo on both the Durand 
Line and Pushtunistan issues and to a certain extent; Pakistan was also successful in 
convincing the Afghan leaders about the illegitimacy of their claims on the two issues.  
2. Second Period (1979-1989)- Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 
In 1979, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, the complexion of the 
region completely changed. All of a sudden, the buffer between Pakistan and the Soviet 
Union diminished, and the Red Army posed a direct security threat, not only to Pakistan, 
but also to the entire Persian Gulf region. The interests of the United States and Pakistan 
converged here, as Pakistan became the front-line state in the containment of the Soviet 
threat. The Soviets were forced to withdraw by the anti-communist Mujahideen forces 
supported by the United States, Saudi Arabia, and other countries. Pakistan’s support for 
the Afghan Mujahideen proved to be invaluable in helping them to contain Soviet 
communism. Moreover, Pakistan successfully used this opportunity in its favor to, not 
only strengthen its ability to extinguish threats to its western borders, but also to 
strengthen its Armed Forces and advance its nuclear weapons program. However, 
Pakistan was unable to achieve its long-term objectives, when it could not help to 
establish friendly government in Afghanistan. The major flaw was in the Geneva Accord, 
which had a limited agenda of ensuring the withdrawal of Soviet forces from 
Afghanistan. It did not provide a framework for the establishment of an interim 
government after the Soviet withdrawal. 
3. Third Period (1989 to 2001) – From the Soviet Withdrawal to the Fall 
of the Taliban 
Pakistan’s Afghan policy after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, up until September 
11, 2001, had been criticized for its failure to play a positive role in bringing a lasting 
5 
solution to Afghan problem. Many factors came into play that made the situation very 
complicated. Mainly, these factors arose from the political vacuum in the region, created 
by the disintegration of the Soviet Union in the region and the U.S. policy of distancing 
itself from the situation. It has been argued that, despite the Soviet withdrawal, the 
shortsightedness of U.S. policy allowed communist Afghans to retain power in 
Afghanistan. The regime installed by Moscow, under Najibullah, fought for nearly three 
more years, finally collapsing in April 1992, after which ensued a bloody power struggle 
among Mujahideen parties vying to rule Afghanistan. The factional fighting among the 
Mujahideen groups created an opportunity for external elements to exploit Afghanistan’s 
internal situation, thereby, creating a conflict of interests among regional and global 
forces. All these conflicting interests resulted in the development of a civil war, 
ultimately culminating in the emergence of the Taliban in 1994.  
By now, Pakistan was more concerned about stability in Afghanistan due to 
another new factor – the emergence of independent states in Central Asia with their 
immense energy potential. Pakistan was now seeking a corridor for trade with Central 
Asian countries. This posed Pakistan with a stark choice whether or not to support and 
recognize this new Taliban power. Three key factors affected Pakistan decision. First,  
the friendly regime will help provide access to Central Asian States. Second, the regime 
will bring stability and not raise the Pashtunistan issue and decide the issue of the border. 
Third, it will not allow sanctuaries to India or any other hostile powers. Cumulatively this 
would serve Pakistan’s objectives of having a neutral western border allowing Pakistan to 
focus on internal security and on India, especially Kashmir which had been in the throes 
of a freedom struggle since 1989. However, Taliban were not puppets of Pakistan, and 
further their radical policies, ultimately created an embarrassing situation for Pakistan, as 
Pakistan got isolated from the international community. Moreover, Pakistan also did not 
form a coherent foreign policy to handle the Afghan crisis that could have rectified the 
situation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Inter Service Intelligence Service (ISI) 
Directorate, and Ministry of Interior, all made decisions independent of one another 
which, they thought, would be in the best interest of the country. The paradigm shift in 
Pakistan’s decision not to support the Taliban after the events of 9/11 was because by 
then Pakistan’s vital national interests were threatened.  Pakistan’s internal vulnerabilities 
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had compounded, Musharraf’s economic revival agenda would have suffered a blow, 
Pakistan strategic assets and nuclear development plans would have also come under 
threat and India was eager to exploit the situation in its favor. These were major factors 
that prompted Pakistan to change its policy, and it decided to cooperate with the United 
States’ response to the September 11 attacks.4    
The last twenty years of war has completely crippled Afghanistan. It might take 
another fifteen to twenty years for Afghanistan to play any role in regional politics. 
However, its instability in the interim period could lead to continuous turbulence in the 
internal security of Pakistan. Moreover, until peace and stability is achieved in 
Afghanistan, and the Afghan economy is able to stand on its own two feet, Afghan 
refugees will remain a burden on the fragile economy of Pakistan (along with all the 
other social complications of the refugee situation). A strong and prosperous Afghanistan 
is a benefit to Pakistan. Pakistan should, therefore, work with the central government of 
Afghanistan, and need not impose its will in bringing about a friendly government. 
Pakistan should be content with having an independent, integrated and friendly western 
neighbor, irrespective of which political faction or ethnic community is in power. It could 
further be argued that, despite the present cold relationship between the two countries, 
other compulsions, especially those caused by economic and security issues, should draw 
them into a long-term, friendly relationship. 
Policy recommendations would be based upon influencing strategies in state to 
state relations. In this context, two policy options would be discussed: “Coercive 
Diplomacy5,” and “Policy of Reassurance”.6 Out of the two policy options, the Policy of 
Reassurance is the recommended course of action.  Under this option, Pakistan needs to 
remain effectively engaged at all levels in Afghan affairs in order to protect its own 
legitimate interests, while not playing favorites.  
 
4 For details see President Mushrraf’s speech in The Dawn, available on line, 
www.dawn.com/2001/09/20/ - 24k – assessed on May 25, 2005. 
5 For details on Coercive Diplomacy see Robert J Art. Coercive Diplomacy : What do we Know (U.S. 
Isntitute of Peace Press, Wahsington DC, 2003). See also Alexandar L. George, David K. Hall, and 
William E. Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Boston : Little, Brown, 1971) 
6 For details see Stein, Gross Janice. Deterrence and Reassurance. Behavior, Society and Nuclear War. 
Vol 2. Oxford University Press 1991. NY. Also see Hass, Richard N and O’Sullivan Meghan L.  Honey 
and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy, (Brooking Institution Press, Washington 2000), 
Chapters 1 and 9. 
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One of the limiting factors faced in writing this thesis has been the scarcity of 
literature on the subject. Few scholars in Pakistan have written seriously on the subject, 
while in the Afghanistan camp, there is virtually none. Therefore, to help create a more 
balanced perspective, this thesis has obtained help from the study of foreign authors. 
Even Western literature has covered little about the Pakistani-Afghan relations dynamics 
in the period from the Soviet withdrawal to the fall of the Taliban. The focus has been 
more on describing the nature of Taliban regime, than on international relations between 
regional countries. Most of the literature on the Taliban presents a journalistic view of the 
situation, not giving real insight into the Afghanistan crisis. Effort has been made in the 
thesis to provide a holistic picture of Pakistan’s Afghanistan relations and, thus, to carry 
out critical analyses of Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy, while also giving policy 
prescription for the future. 
B. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter II discusses Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy, from Pakistan’s independence 
to up till the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (1947 to 1979). In doing so, it seeks to 
answer the question, “What were the issues that strained Pakistan and Afghanistan’s 
relations?” This chapter addresses the two major issues, namely the Durand Line and 
Pushtunistan, both of which have been the cause of conflict between Pakistan and 
Afghanistan since 1947. Largely as a result of this Afghan-Pakistani antagonism from 
1947 to 1989, all Afghan governments have sided with New Dehli. The military 
cooperation between both capitals and Moscow was also a concern for Pakistan. 
Afghanistan’s occasional security threat to Pakistan, and its encouragement to a 
nationalist insurgency in the Pakistani province of Baluchistan (by inciting the groups in 
Pakistan) will be deliberated. Pakistan’s ability to manage the tension, while maintaining 
its legitimate right on the Durand line will be discussed.   
Chapter III will discuss Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy after the Soviet occupation 
of Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989. This chapter addresses the question of how Pakistan 
was able to exert diplomatic and military pressure, along with the United States, with the 
result that the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan. The Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan created a new security situation, not only for Pakistan, but also for the entire 
region. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan provided an opportunity for Pakistan to wage 
8 
a more offensive policy. Pakistan’s Afghan policy was manifold. The first, and 
immediate, priority was given to thwarting the Soviet threat, and the second priority was 
to establish a friendly government in Afghanistan. This was done by organizing the 
Islamist movement and various Mujahideen groups in the name of Islamic cause. 
Pakistan was able to achieve its first objective. However, it could not install a friendly 
government after the withdrawal of Soviet Union. The causes of the failure to establish a 
friendly government will be analyzed in detail.  
Chapter IV will examine the period from the Soviet withdrawal to the fall of the 
Taliban (1989-2001). This chapter will discuss the complex nature of the situation in 
Afghanistan, which developed as a result of collapse of Soviet Union and emergence of 
new central Asian states. It will also discuss how the United State’s diminished interest in 
the region has helped to create a power vacuum which, in turn, has led other regional 
actors to play a role in the region. The chapter will also discuss how these conflicting 
interests affected the region’s stability, and led to civil war in Afghanistan and, 
ultimately, to the emergence of the Taliban. International reaction to the Taliban, 
including the U.S. policy toward the Taliban, will be discussed in detail. Analysis of why 
Pakistan’s supported Taliban and the context in which Pakistan recognized Taliban 
regime will be given. In the end, analysis of Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy will be done 
to establish the causes of failure of Pakistan’s policy during the period.  
Chapter V presents a conclusion by discussing the current geo-political situation 
in Afghanistan. It highlights the forces which could become the source of a convergence 
of interests for both governments, and, thus, can lead to friendly relations between the 
two countries. Summaries and recommendations will be offered in the end, hypothesizing 
guidelines for Pakistan’s Afghan policy.  
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Just after the independence of Pakistan, in December of 1947, Afghanistan 
denounced former treaties with regard to the Indo-Afghan border (known as “the Durand 
Line”) with the British government of India. It also laid a claim to the formation of a 
Pathan State within the borders of Pakistan (i.e., Pushtunistan). Pakistan rejected both of 
these proposals made by the government of Afghanistan, considering them to be 
interference in the internal matters of the Pakistan.  And later, when Pakistan joined the 
South Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Asian Treaty Organization 
(CENTO), to elevate its security threat vis-à-vis India, Afghanistan came under the 
influence of Soviet Union and India, falling into a socialist block. Consequently, a 
Soviet-Indo-Afghanistan nexus became one of the main irritants in establishing cordial 
relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan; one that would be free of disputes. As a 
result of Afghan-Pakistani antagonisms from 1947 to 1989, all governments in Kabul 
sided with New Delhi. Moreover, close military relations between the two capitals and 
Moscow were also a concern for Islamabad. However, to secure its western border, 
Pakistan remained engaged with Afghanistan in a defensive capacity in order to resolve 
disputes. In this regard, the strategic goals of Pakistan have been to maintain friendly 
relations with Afghan governments, in order to prevent the reconstruction of a Kabul-
Delhi nexus. Meanwhile, Pakistan also tried to convince Afghan leaders about their 
illegitimate claims on border issues.  
This chapter will illustrate the degree to which Pakistan was able to achieve its 
national security goals with regard to resolving the Durand Line and Pushtunistan issues. 
Thus, it will be organized in three distinct sections. The first section explains the security 
constraints under which Pakistan had to form its foreign policy (with regard to 
Afghanistan, in particular). This would explain the motivations of the three countries, i.e., 
Pakistan, Afghanistan and India, in advancing their own policies with respect to each 
other. The second section discusses the main issues of the Durand Line and Pushtunistan. 
With this background, in third section, Pakistan-Afghanistan relations from 1947 to 1979 
10 
                                                
will be discussed. This will help in determining the success or failure of Pakistan’s 
Afghanistan policy during the period.  
B. PAKISTAN’S SECURITY CONSTRAINTS 
Pakistan was born amid the upheavals of partition in 1947. Therefore, it faced a 
series of monumental tasks. Internally, it was confronted with a refugee settlement 
problem and the problems associated with building cohesion between the east and west 
wings of the country. Externally, having almost no army with which to defend its 
frontiers, there was the Kashmir problem with India, and border disputes with 
Afghanistan--all in all, it must have seemed like a nightmare for the policy-makers of 
Pakistan. Ian Stephens presented a gloomy picture for Pakistan’s future when he said,  
It was evident that if, on Pakistan’s birth, coordinated movements opposed 
to her could be produced in Kashmir and Afghanistan, both of them 
predominantly Muslim territories and near to one another, the new state 
might be still-born, crushed by a sort of pincer-movement.7  
Even Mountbatten had similar views on the future of Pakistan, who, while 
commenting on tensions between Pakistan and India over the question of Junagardh, said 
that in the case of war between India and Pakistan “(it) might be an end of Pakistan 
altogether.”8 Also, in the international arena, Pakistan could not find a single country that 
it could count on as being an unfailing friend and ally; someone willing to lend her aid 
and support in her times of need.9 In such a severe environment, Pakistan’s primary 
objective was to preserve the territorial integrity and security of Pakistan.10
This was a unique situation for any country, who, right on its birth, had to  face 
two unfriendly neighbors; neighbors with which it shared more than two third of its 
border. This peculiar security environment had a major impact in shaping Pakistan’s 




7 Ian Stephen, Horned Moon, London, Chatto and Windus, 1953. p.108, cited by Aslam Siddiqi, Pakistan Seeks 
Security. p. 25 
8 Ziring, Braibatni, and Wriggins. Pakistan : The Long View. Durham, N.C. Duke University Press. 1977.  S.M. 
Burki : The Management of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: p. 349 
9 Ibid. p. 345.  
10 Ziring, Pakistan : The Long View. Norman D . Palmer : Pakistan : The Long Search for Foreign Policy, p. 422. 
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1. Pakistan’s Apprehensions Towards India 
Afghanistan though, could pose problems among tribal peoples of Pakistan. 
However, by comparison with India, Afghanistan was less of a worry. Pakistan was 
obsessed with the threat from its most powerful, and generally hostile, larger neighbor 
India. Pakistan’s perception of the threat from India was derived from the sheer size of 
India, as well as from the size of its army. There was a great deal of strategic and 
economic asymmetry between the two countries. Pakistan’s geographical compulsions 
(e.g., East and West Pakistan were separated by over 1000 miles of Indian territory) 
added to Pakistan’s fears of being overly vulnerable. This fear, too, was compounded by 
repeated statements made by Indian leaders regarding the tragedy of partition; a fear 
which intensified Pakistan’s conviction that India had not yet reconciled itself to the 
existence of Pakistan. President Ayub Khan comments, 
We have an enemy, an implacable enemy in India.….India’s ambition to 
absorb Pakistan or turn her into a satellite. The Indian leaders made no 
secret of their designs. Mr. Acharya Kripalani, who was the President of 
the Indian National Congress in 1947, declared, ‘neither the Congress nor 
the nation has given its claim of a united India. Sardar V.B Patel, the first 
Indian Home Minister and the ‘strong man’ of the Congress Party, 
announced at about the same time, ‘sooner or later, we shall again be 
united in common alliance to our country.11  
Thus, from the day of her Independence, Pakistan was involved in a bitter and 
prolonged struggle for her very existence and survival. According to an Indian writer, 
Niran C. Chaudhuri, “India held pistol at the head of Pakistan until, in 1954, the 
American alliance recovered the country from the nightmare”.12 Therefore, the quest for 
national integrity and security, particularly vis-à-vis India, has been the primary, and 
most constant theme in Pakistan’s foreign policy.  This “fixation” on India has, in fact, 
largely shaped Pakistan’s relations with and attitude towards other countries and has 
remained central to every calculation of its foreign policy makers.13  
 
11 Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends not Masters (London : Oxford University Press, 1967), 55, 115, 
116. 
12 S.M. Burke, “The management of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy” in Pakistan: The Long View  (Durham 
: Duke University Press, 1977), 358. 
13 W. Howard Wriggins, “The Balancing Process in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy” in Pakistan : The Long 
View  (Durham : Duke University Press, 1977), 303. 
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Consequently, since Pakistan was confronted with such a hostile geo-political 
environment, it could not afford a second front towards her west (i.e., Afghanistan) that 
was also unfriendly. With this pre-condition, Pakistan shaped its Afghan policy. 
However, Afghanistan did not view the situation in quite the same way--rather, 
Afghanistan had its own agendas. This thesis will now discuss the apprehensions 
Afghanistan had towards Pakistan.  
2. Afghanistan’s Reservations towards Pakistan 
It is important to understand, what were the driving forces behind the Afghan 
leader’s motivations in formulating their foreign policy towards Pakistan. President 
Mohammed Ayub Khan describes Afghanistan’s reservations in the following words, 
When Pakistan came into existence, there were two misconceptions in the 
minds of Afghan leaders. First misconception was the result of Indian 
constant propaganda that Pakistan would not be able to survive as a 
separate state. Afghan leaders believed this to be true and decided to stake 
claims on to Pakistan territory before it was disintegrated. Consequently, 
they laid claim on Pushtunistan…..The second misconception lay in the 
attitude of the Afghan rulers themselves. If their assumption proved wrong 
and Pakistan did survive, they realized that Pakistan would be a 
democratic country. This would naturally undermine the position of the 
rulers in Afghanistan. So they made these claims to our lands.14
Therefore, it appears that it was basically fueled by fears that the establishment of 
a democratic country in their neighborhood would have adverse implications on the 
legitimacy of the monarchy in Afghanistan. Moreover, Peshawar, as compared to Kabul, 
was economically in a better condition. Thus, it might have been a source of 
dissatisfaction for the Pushtun people of Afghanistan, who shared ethnic ties with 
Pakistan‘s Pushtuns, thereby causing instability in Afghanistan. The theoretical 
explanation of the phenomenon is given by Robert Jervis, “when there are believed to be 
tight linkages between domestic and foreign policy or between the domestic policies of 
two states the quest for security may drive states to interfere preemptively in the domestic 
politics of others in order to provide an ideological buffer zone”.15  
 
 
14 Ibid.,  174-175. 
15 Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma” in World Politics, Vol XXX  No2 
(January 1978), 168. 
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3. Perspective on the Indo-Afghan Nexus  
India-Afghanistan relations have been a classical case of Kautilyan’s theory, that 
is an ‘enemy’s enemy is (a) friend’. India found Afghanistan in a strategically important 
position to serve her designs. In India’s designs, in case of a war with Pakistan over the 
issue of Kashmir, Afghanistan would be able to open the second front against Pakistan on 
the North-West Frontier. Thereby, Pakistan could be faced with a two front war. 
Additionally, such an alliance would also ensure that Pakistan would not be able to use 
Afghan tribesmen against India. Thus, India may have thought that they would be able to 
corner Pakistan and embarrass her by pincer-type movement.16
C. THE ISSUES: THE DURAND LINE AND PUSHTUNISTAN 
1. The Durand Line Issue  
The Durand line resulted from a “Great Game,” i.e., a game played by Russia and 
British India in manifesting their desires to expand their empires. Russia’s expansion was 
motivated by their desire to weaken British power, both in India and its extension into 
Europe. On the other hand, the British followed a “forward policy” in order to contain the 
Russians within central Asia. Although neither power held Afghanistan during this time, 
Afghanistan’s role as a buffer between them grew throughout the 1800s, leading to 
repeated clashes on its fringes.17
In eighty years, the British fought three wars in Afghanistan. The first Anglo war 
(1838-1842) was fought because of British concern over Russians long-term interests in 
Afghanistan. The first Anglo-Russian war heated up the confrontation between the two 
powers. Both started to push the outer limits of their power. The British shifted to a 
forward policy, vis-à-vis Afghanistan, and began to press the Amir of Afghanistan to 
establish the British mission in Kabul. In response the Russians sent an unsolicited 
diplomatic mission to Kabul. When the British were refused in their diplomatic mission 
in Kabul, they invaded Afghanistan. Thus, the second Anglo-Afghan war (1878-1880) 
began, as the first had, over British concerns and Russian intrigues in Afghanistan. Two 
developments of importance came out of this, first the treaty of Gandamak in May 26, 
 
16 Ayub Khan, Friends not Masters, 175. 
17 Larry P Goodson, Afghanistan’s Endless War : State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the 
Taliban (Washington DC : University of Washington Press, 2001), 31. 
1879 that ceded strategic border areas to the British (notably the Khyber pass, Kurram 
Valley, Pishin and Sibi,) and second, it provided British to control Afghanistan’s foreign 
affairs and rise of Amir Abdul Rahman Khan in Kabul.18  
Amir Abdul Rahman Khan ruled Afghanistan for the last two decades of the 19th 
century. He was prevented from expanding externally by Russia in the north and 
northeast, the British in the north and northwest and Persia in the east. Internally, he was 
also surrounded by many difficulties. Not only he faced general rebellion all over the 
country, but he also had to fight four civil wars. Therefore, his first priority was to 
consolidate his position internally. After he had satisfactorily consolidated his position to 
an extent, he turned towards reforms that he felt were necessary for making Afghanistan 
a great nation in the future. Amir felt that reforms would not be possible until a boundary 
line was marked along the perimeter of Afghanistan so that people could know what 
provinces really belonged to Afghanistan.19  
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to demarcate Afghanistan’s eastern border. Abdul Rehman made a request to the British 
Viceroy, Sir Mortimer Durand, the Foreign Secretary of British India, to head the 
Mission for negotiations.20  The boundary, as decided upon by the parties, was made the 
subject of an agreement by the Amir on November 12, 1893. The border line split 17 
million Afghan, non-Afghan, Baloch and Brahui tribes on both sides. Although, 
geographically speaking, a much better frontier than the Durand Line would have been 
the line of the Hindu Kush mountains, in the interests of British policy it was desirable to 
keep a strip of Afghan territory as a buffer zone between British India and Russia.21 The 
Line gave control of all strategic entry points (Khyber, Tochi, Kurram and Bolan) and 
other strategic heights along the border to the British, who developed an extensive 
strategic railroad communication to ensure quicker shifting of forces, should the buffer 
state of Afghanistan fail to check the onslaught of Russia.  
Later on, the Afghan rulers reaffirmed the treaty three times. Habibullah, son of 
Abdul Rahman, reaffirmed to British government in 1905 that he would abide by the 
‘agreements and compacts’ entered into by his father.22 However, in 1919, Ammanullah 
(son of Habibullah) launched an attack on the frontier in the hope of recovering 
“Peshawar and up to the river Indus.” The invasion was contained, and the Afghans were 
obliged to sue for peace. Two treaties followed the interim Treaty of Rawalpindi (1919) 
and permanent Anglo-Afghan treaty (1921). These, in effect, reaffirmed the Durand 
agreement.23 When Nadir Shah ascended to the throne of Afghanistan in 1930, the 
validity of the 1921 treaty was reaffirmed by an exchange of letters between the British 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Afghan minister in London.24
Although the Durand line was confirmed by successive Afghan governments, it 
was not accepted by the government of King Zahir Shah after the withdrawal of British 
 
20 Ibid,. 82. 
21 Ibid,. 83. 
22 Olaf Caroe, The Pathans, 550 B.C.-A.D. 1957 (London : Macmillan & Co Ltd, 1965), 464. 
23 Burke, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy,  84. 
24 Olaf, The Pathan,  465. 
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from India.25 What follows is a brief examination of the arguments which Afghan 
spokesmen allege when campaigning for the invalidity of the Durand Line. 
a. Afghanistan’s Point of View 
At this point in history, the Afghan government had two objections to the 
treaty. First, they contend that the Durand Line was established under duress. Second, as 
the British Government in India has ceased to exist, they also contend that the Anglo-
Afghan Treaty of 1921 is null and void. Thus, they have laid claim to all areas between 
the Durand Line and the River Indus.26
b. Pakistan’s Point of View 
Conversely, Pakistan contends that, because the Durand Agreement was 
negotiated at the request of Amir Abdul Rahman, himself, with a British official of 
Amir’s own choice, and Amir and his advisor publicly accepted the Agreement, thereby 
declaring that they were satisfied with it, it likely was not signed under duress27. 
Moreover, for half a century after the signing, every Afghan ruler had reaffirmed the 
validity of the Durand Line as the agreed upon frontier between Afghanistan and India. 
This contention is further strengthened by the fact that the government of India Act of 
1935 formally defined India to include the tribal territory.  
With regard to the second argument, it is a well-settled proposition of 
international law that according to the principle of ‘res transit cum suo onere’, treaties of 
extinct states concerning boundary lines … remain valid, and all rights and duties arising 
from such treaties of the extinct state devolve on the absorbing State.28 The United 
Kingdom government had also expressed its public agreement regarding the validity of 




25 Shahid Javid Burki, Pakistan a Nation in the Making, (Karachi : Oxford University Press, 1986), 
185. 
26 Burke. Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis,  87. 
27 Olaf, The Pathans,  381.  
28 Oppenhein’s International Law, ed. Lauterpacht, I (ch. I s. 8 2b) 
29 Olaf, The Pathans,  436. 
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2. The Pushtunistan Issue 
The issue of Pushtunistan is closely linked with the Durand Line as a troublesome 
tribal boundary. Afghanistan, following the argument that the Durand Line was accepted 
under pressure, contends that Pushtuns living on either side should have the right of self-
determination, as they were forcibly separated from their motherland. Secondly, the 
Afghan government argues that the inhabitants of Pushtunistan are one nation and that 
the Durand Line arbitrarily splits the nation into two.30
a. Pakistan’s Point of View   
Because Pakistan contends that Pushtuns voted for Pakistan in the 1947 
referendum in Peshawar, it, therefore, refutes validity of the Afghanistan position. 
Secondly, Afghanistan’s concern for the unity of Pushtuns is not genuine because 
Afghanistan does not include the Pushtuns on its side of the line in the proposed state of 
“Pushtunistan”.31 Rather, the Pushtunistan of Afghanistan’s conception would consist 
solely of areas now within Pakistan. The Pushtuns would, therefore, continue to be split 
between two sovereign states. This raises the question of ambiguity, thereby weakening 
the arguments for an independent Pushtunistan.32 The notion that the Durand Line is an 
arbitrary line is a misconception. Johan C. Griffiths explains, 
It (Durand Line) generally follows tribal boundaries, separating those tribe 
which go to market in Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Tank and Quetta from 
those with economic links with Khorasan, having Kabul, Ghazni and 
Kandhar as their market towns. Only in two cases, the Mohmands and the 
Wazirs is a tribe divided.33
 
30 See Figure 1, the darker portion in the map indicates the Pushtun speaking areas, split between 
Pakistan and Afghanistan by the Durand Line.  
31 Olaf, The Pathans, 436.  
32 Burke, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, 88. 
33 Burke. Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis., 87. Ct Johan C. Griffiths, Afghanistan, 
Appendix I, Historical Note by Sir Olaf Caroe. 
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As a matter of fact, Afghans, themselves, were not very clear in their demands 
regarding Pushtunistan. Apparently, to them Pushtunistan had different meanings at 
different times.34 President Ayub Khan has best described this in the following way:- 
They (Afghan) had defined Pushtunistan in variety of ways, as a separate 
independent state, as an autonomous area, as a unit within Pakistan to be 
called Pushtunistan, and sometimes only as a demand for a reference to be 
made to the Pathans to indicate whether they were happy with 
Pakistan…….35    
The Afghan government first made this claim in 1946, when an interim 
government was set up in India. At that time, it did not attract much attention, and claim 
was officially rejected by Mr. Nehru, then head of the interim government in Delhi. But it 
constituted launching of the since stubborn Pushtunistan demand.36  And when under the 
June 3, 1947 plan referendum was organized in North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) 
the Indian National Congress made a demand that the province should be allowed to opt 
for independence as well. Lord Mountbatten rejected the demand.  
Afterwards, the partition issue of Pushtunistan remained a perpetual source of 
conflict between the two states, resulting in the severance of diplomatic relations and in 
military operations on the border. India and the Soviet Union both contributed fuel to the 
issue. The demands for an independent Pushtunistan lost their momentum after the 
invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in 1979. Presently, the issue fails to capture 
the hearts of Pakistani Pushtuns any more due to their absorption in the Pakistani state, 
and the sad plight of both Afghans and Afghanistan. However, the issue has the potential 
 
34 Dilip Mukerjee, “Afghanistan under Daud : Relations with Neighbouring States” in Asian Survey, 
Vol. 15, No 4. (Apr, 1975), .302.  Dilip writes “The Pushtunistan demand is difficult to define because 
Afghanistan has never spelled it out. Pushtunistan literally means the land of Pushtuns, meaning the 
Pashto-speaking people. They live both in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Baluchi, speaking an entirely 
different tongue, are described as “southern Pahstoons” in Kabul. The claim was made in a book on the 
subject published in the early 1950s by Abdul Rahman Puzhwak, now Afghan Ambassador in New Delhi, 
that Pushtunistan includes the whole area from Chitral and Swat down to Las Bela on the Arabian Sea, 
roughly comprising Pakistan’s two provinces North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan. When Daud 
was Asked in the summer of 1974 by an Indian journalist to define Pushtunistan’s territorial extent, his 
terse reply was: “ this is well known”.   
35 Ayub Khan, Friends not Masters,  176. 
36 Ian Stephen, Pakistan. old country / new Nation (England : Penguins Books Ltd, 1964) 265. 
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to again strain Pak-Afghan relations in the future. Thus, conflict between Pakistan and 
Afghanistan appears unlikely to be over with regard to the issue of Pushtunistan.37  
D. PAKISTAN’S STRATEGY 
Since independence, due to its security dilemmas, Pakistan has aspired to friendly, 
cordial and mutually beneficial relations with Afghanistan. To achieve these objectives, 
Pakistan has tried to follow a policy of restrain and patience towards Afghanistan during 
the period. For example, Pakistan gave Afghanistan all possible facilities for the passage 
of goods on railways. It also did not establish any controls on trade with Afghanistan.38 
In effect, as Pakistan was tied up on both the fronts, Pakistan was most anxious to avoid 
any clash with Afghanistan. Thus, it did not want to let any disorder develop on its 
western border due to close proximity of the Soviet Union.39 Under such circumstances, 
Pakistan was left with one option, namely to maintain the status quo, strengthening its 
own security. Meanwhile, Pakistan tried to convince Afghan leaders about the 
illegitimacy of their claims, thereby hoping that situation would improve. Such a strategy 
had the affect of making Pakistan’s Afghan policy reactionary with regard to 
Afghanistan’s unfriendly policy towards Pakistan.  
The aforementioned background information should help in understanding 
Pakistan-Afghanistan relations from the period of Pakistan’s gaining independence to the 
invasion of the Soviet Union into Afghanistan.  
E. PAKSITAN-AFGHANISTAN RELATIONS 
From the beginning, Afghanistan has followed a policy of hostility towards 
Pakistan, and remained committed to its demands regarding Pushtunistan. For example, 
Afghanistan was the only country to oppose Pakistan’s admission to the United Nations, 
conditioning its recognition upon the provision that the right of self-determination be 
given to the people of Pakistan’s NWFP.40 Actually, the demand for Pushtunistan was 
made in December 1947, when the Indian Army was poised for a quick advance into 
Kashmir, on Pakistan’s border.41 Since then, raids from Afghanistan into Pakistani 
 
37 Burki. Pakistan a Nation in the Making, 185. 
38 Ibid,. 174-175. 
39 Mujtaba Razvi, The Frontiers of Pakistan ( Karachi : National Publishing House Ltd, 1971), 156. 
40 Burke. Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis,  73. 
41 Saddiqi, Pakistan Seeks Security,  25. 
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territories have taken place from time to time. The first major raid occurred in July 1948, 
when Faqir of Ipi attacked the Dattakhel and Boya posts in North Waziristan, setting 
them on fire. His lashker (i.e., army) even surrounded Razmak, Dosalli and Tal. But 
scouts and loyal tribesmen fought him back. Prince Abdul Karim of Kalat led another 
lashkar into Baluchistan. He was beaten and was, himself, arrested at Harboii (Kalat).42  
In 1949, Afghanistan became more active, moving two armored divisions and Air 
Force to a place on the Afghan-Pakistan border. This was done, presumably, with the 
hope that it may give moral support to certain tribal interests on the Pakistan side of the 
Durand Line. The Afghan campaign reached to its climax when, in 1950, Afghan King 
Zahir Shah made an anti-Pakistan speech at a celebration in Kabul. The Afghanistan flag 
was hoisted and anti-Pakistan leaflets were dropped by the Afghan Air Force.43 On 9 
January 1950, Liaquat Ali Khan in a Parliament speech, while following a strategy of 
restraint, condemned Afghanistan for her hostilities.44
While Afghanistan continued with its hostile actions, India helped Afghanistan to 
keep up their propaganda against Pakistan to serve her own interests. The issue of 
Pushtunistan was kindled by the Indians, and kept alive while the pro-India regime lasted 
in Afghanistan.45 The Indian government not only allowed ‘Pushtunistan Jirga’ to be held 
in Delhi46, but also made “All India” radio available to Sardar Najubullah Khan for 
making anti Pakistani speeches on May 27, 1951. Dupree describes Indian involvement 
as follows, 
I was among those who were in Pakistan and Afghanistan almost 
immediately after partition in 1947, I looked into what was happening in 
 
42 Ibid., 26. 
43 Razvi, The Frontiers of Pakistan, 156-157. 
44 Ibid.,  26. Liquat Ali Khan said, “That for some incomprehensible reasons, this neighborly Muslim 
state had been following a policy of open hostility to Pakistani, ever since it opposed Pakistan’s admission 
in UN……Pakistan could not be expected for ever to continue pleading for friendship and that not on inch 
of our land will be surrendered to anybody, come what may”. 
45 Kamal Matinuddin, The Taliban Phenomenon : Afghanistan 1994–1997 (Karachi : Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 3. 
46 Stephen, Pakistan : old country / new Nation, 265. 
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Kabul. There was a group of Indians there controlling Kabul Radio, and 
they are the ones who even invented the term Pushtunistan.47  
Pak-Afghan relations took another down turn when the Afghan Prime minister, 
Sardar Daud Khan, a main supporter of the Pushtunistan demands, threatened Pakistan 
with undesirable consequences if it went ahead with the proposed merger of West 
Pakistan’s provinces into ‘One Unit’. In her campaign, the Afghanistan government 
requested factory managers to give their workers two hours off every afternoon for two 
weeks to take part in Pushtunistan-related protests. This propaganda led to an incident 
when, on March 30, 1955, about 150 demonstrators attacked Pakistan’s embassy in 
Kabul. Similar attacks were made on Pakistan consulates in Kandhar and Jalalabad. 
These incidents ultimately led to the breakup of diplomatic relations between the two 
countries. Subsequently, after the mediation of some other Muslim countries, a settlement 
was reached between Pakistan and Afghanistan on September 9, 1955.48  
To help improve its defensive capabilities against India, Pakistan joined the U.S. 
sponsored anti-Communist pacts, SEATO and CENTO, in 1954 and 1955. The Afghan 
prime minister Sardar Daud, described U.S. military aid to Pakistan as presenting a grave 
danger to the security and peace of Afghanistan. In reaction to this, in December 1955, a 
new development took place in the region when the Soviet Union declared its support for 
the Afghan policy in regard to Pushtunistan. This facilitated the Soviet economic 
penetration into Afghanistan.49 Such Soviet support for Afghanistan enabled it to adopt 
even a more uncompromising attitude towards Pakistan.50  
However, despite these developments, Pak-Afghan relations improved some in 
the following years. For example, in August 1956, President Iskandar Mirza took 
initiative and paid a good-will visit to Kabul. This was followed by Prime Minister H.S 
Suhurawardy’s visit in June 1957. In return, the Afghan Prime Minister Daud and King 
Zahir Shah also paid visits to Pakistan. A number of other steps were taken to improve 
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the relations, including the commencement of air service, the establishment of a direct 
radio link between Karachi and Kabul, and the entry of both countries into the Transit 
Trade agreement of May 1958, under which no custom duty had to be paid on imported 
goods destined for Afghanistan.51  
Meanwhile, India continued its support for Afghanistan on the issue of 
Pushtunistan. The issue was again brought up when an ‘All-India Pushtun Jirga’ was held 
in Delhi in October 1958. In this Jirga, several resolutions were passed containing 
demands made on behalf of Pushtunistan. Prime Minister Daud’s reiteration to a Japanese 
correspondent of Afghanistan’s claim regarding the NWFP, and the Afghan Foreign 
Minister’s visit to Moscow, both tended to show the ‘identity of views on world affairs,’ 
thereby, once again, straining relations between the two countries. This led to another 
series of raids on Pakistan territory by Afghan lashkars (i.e., armies) in May 1961. These, 
once again, led to the termination of diplomatic relations. Sardar Daud, who was a main 
proponent of Pushtunistan, resigned in March 1963, and was replaced by Dr Mohammed 
Yousaf. The change improved the atmosphere between the two states, and diplomatic 
relations were restored in May 1963. Zahir Shah paid a good-will visit to Pakistan in 
1968. Islamabad’s decision to disband the One Unit strategy, thus restoring the former 
provinces of West Pakistan, further helped reducing tensions between the two countries. 
Overall, during the period of Zahir Shah, Pakistan-Afghanistan relations remained 
strained, but Pakistan never felt required to deploy force along the Durand line.  
However, relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan again took a down turn 
when Sardar Daud overthrew King Zahir Shah and became the president of Afghanistan 
in July 1973. At this time, the Soviet Union fully supported Daud’s government. The 
Daud regime again raised the issue of Pushtunistan. For the first time, it also moved the 
forces closer to borders, resulting in a reciprocal deployment of troops from Pakistan.52  
At the same time, resentment and resistance against communist influence was also 
increasing, particularly from politico-religious entities. As a result of Daud’s crack down, 
Gulbadin Hikmatyar and Burhanuddin Rabbani, both opposition leaders, escaped to 
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Peshawar (Pakistan) from Kabul, continuing their resistance efforts from there.53  
Pakistan and Afghanistan were again at loggerheads, as Daud encouraged a nationalist 
insurgency in Baluchistan, while Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto used Rabbani and Hikmatyar to 
destabilize Daud’s government. Subsequently, several leaders from Baluchistan fled to 
Afghanistan, setting up their camps there to fight back.54 Thus, during the mid-70s, both 
countries continued to support each other’s dissident leaders on a quid pro quo basis.55  
A significant foreign policy achievement took place in 1976 regarding Pakistan’s 
relations with Afghanistan when Daud became convinced that his policies towards 
Pakistan were causing more harm to his government than good. Moreover, by this time 
the Soviets had completely infiltrated the Afghan Army, the Afghan media, the Afghan 
educational institutions, etc.56 Soviet influence in internal affairs was also cause of 
concern for Daud. Consequently, Daud tried to normalize relations with Pakistan. As a 
result, an exchange of visits between the two leaders of these countries took place in mid-
1976. These visits not only helped in diffusing the tensions between the countries, but 
also brought them closer to finding an amicable solution of the Pushtunistan issue. 
Whereas, Pakistan Prime Minister Bhutto agreed to release the National Awami Party 
leaders, Daud agreed to recognize the Durand Line as the boundary between Pakistan and 
Afghanistan. However, before this agreement was signed, Bhutto was removed by Zia ul 
Haq in a 1977 military coup. Although a similar agreement was also reached between Zia 
and Daud, this time it was Daud’s overthrow by Soviet backed communist forces in April 
1978 that derailed the process of settlement.57 These events precipitated the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. Thus, a new chapter in Pakistan-Afghanistan 
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F. CONCLUSION 
The central determinants of Pakistan’s foreign policy since independence have 
been to safeguard its territorial integrity and political independence, both of which might 
be weakened by the centrifugal forces generated by India and, second, to get Afghanistan 
to drop its irredentist claim by recognizing the validity of the Pakistan-Afghan border 
demarcated in 1893, reaffirmed no less than four times since that time. Every other 
constituent part of Pakistan’s foreign policy has flowed from these two basic felt needs. 
There were two reasons for Afghanistan’s inhibition towards Pakistan. First, 
Afghanistan rulers have perceived the emergence of Pakistan, its neighbor, as a 
democratic country as a threat to their kingship (i.e., monarchical system). Second, the 
dissemination of propaganda by India, proclaiming that Pakistan would not be able to 
survive as an independent state, has reinforced Afghanistan’s claims regarding 
Pushtunistan. As such, Pakistan was confronted with a two-front war. To alleviate the 
perceived threat to its security, Pakistan joined SEATO and CENTO. This did not fit into 
the Soviet Union’s scheme of maneuvers and, thus, it reacted strongly by supporting 
Afghanistan’s Pushtunistan claims against Pakistan. Thus Pakistan was confronted with 
an Afghan-Soviet-Indian axis pitted against them.  
In such a geo-political environment, Pakistan-Afghanistan relations have had to 
develop. During the period of 1947 to 1979, there were many ups and downs in Pakistan-
Afghanistan relations. Since independence, Pakistan has aspired to build a friendly, 
cordial and mutually beneficial relationship with Afghanistan. However it also had to 
remain prepared for new situations on the Afghan side and adapt accordingly. Thus, it 
was basically an action and reaction policy. Pakistan, as such, did not interfere in the 
internal affairs of Afghanistan, except during the periods of Prime Minster Zulfiqar Ali 
Bhutto’s time leading Pakistan and Daud’s reign in Afghanistan, when Bhutto supported 
Islamic movement leaders of Afghanistan in response to Daud’s support of Baluch 
leaders from Baluchistan.  
A change in the thinking of the policy-makers in Afghanistan was triggered by 
too much involvement by Soviet communists in Afghanistan, and Afghanistan’s growing 
economic dependence on Pakistan and Iran. Daud realized that his policies of 
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confrontation with Pakistan may have been counter-productive for his country. 
Subsequently, an exchange of visits by Daud and Bhutto paved the way for a solution to 
the decades old confrontation regarding the legitimacy of the Durand line. However, the 
removal of Bhutto in 1977, and Daud in 1978, derailed the process of resolving the issue.  
Therefore, the question arises, “Was Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy successful?” 
Two factors need to be considered in measuring success or failure of Pakistan’s 
Afghanistan policy during the period studied. First, Pakistan achieved significant success 
with regard to the major issues of the Durand Line and Pushtunistan--Pakistan was able 
to convince Afghan leaders about the illegitimacy of their claims on both the issues, thus, 
bringing Afghan leaders to the negotiating table for a resolution of the dispute. Second, 
despite Afghanistan’s cold relations with Pakistan, and warm relations with India, during 
the 1965 and 1971 wars (between India and Pakistan), Afghanistan remained neutral, not 
supporting India, as expected.58 This not only can be seen as a success for Pakistan’s 
Afghanistan policy, but is might also be an indication that, despite territorial issues 
between both countries, ethnic and religious bonds played a key role, and would continue 
to act as a centrifugal force, drawing both countries towards each other. This so-called 
soft power59 should be considered by Pakistani policy-makers while forming future 
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III. PAKISTAN’S AFGHANISTAN POLICY AFTER THE 
SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN-1979 TO 1989 
 
 
  A. INTRODUCTION 
A major change took place in Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy when the Soviet 
Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979. The Soviet invasion completely changed the 
complexion of the region. The Red Army now posed a direct threat, not only to Pakistan, 
but also to the entire Persian Gulf region. Conceivably, the Soviets might have used 
Afghanistan as a stepping stone to reach to Indian Ocean, a possible fulfillment of their 
stated ambition of acquiring a warm water port. Pakistan’s fears were manifold. 
According to their worst fears, Pakistan planners visualized a war with India on two 
different fronts becoming a reality.  At the very least, a Communist victory had the 
potential of creating a permanent border threat, since the Soviet military presence in 
Afghanistan was perceived to be indefinite. Furthermore, because of the mass exodus 
from Afghanistan, what soon became the settlement of more than 3.2 million refugees 
posed a threat of another kind, this one to the country’s economic prosperity and national 
security. The new situation was not acceptable to Pakistan, in any way; therefore, it had 
to fight a war for its security and integrity.   
Although the situation created challenges for Pakistan, as it was forced to 
confront an ideologically hostile super power but simultaneously it also created 
opportunities that Pakistan could redress some of its security concerns by neutralizing 
previous bitter experiences with regard to Afghanistan. Another positive aspect of the 
Soviet invasion was renewed U.S. interests in Pakistan. As Pakistan expert Marvin 
Weinbaum put it, “Pakistan’s strategic objectives became convergent with those of 
United States”.60 General Zia, in March 1980, showed his agreement with this when he 
said, “you take Pakistan out of this region and you will find that you have not an inch of 
soil where America can have influence.”61 Apart from supporting the resistance 
movement in Afghanistan, General Zia used this opportunity, not only to strengthen 
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Pakistan’s armed forces, but also to forward Pakistan’s nuclear program and prolong his 
own rule. Although Pakistan’s short-term policy objectives were to ensure the withdrawal 
of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, Pakistani policy makers could also see that their 
long-term objective of establishing a friendly government in Afghanistan might be 
hastened by their efforts, as well.  
Confronting a super power was an offensive and a risky policy. Any direct 
confrontation with the Soviet Union may have led to a war breaking out between Pakistan 
and the Soviet Union. Cognizant of this situation, Pakistan skillfully organized and 
manipulated the Afghan resistance movement against communist forces, simultaneously 
putting diplomatic pressure on the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan.  
Pakistan achieved its short-term objective when the Soviet Union withdrew from 
Afghanistan in 1989, in accordance with the Geneva Accord agreement. However, it 
failed to achieve its long-term objectives, once Mujahideen could not establish their 
government in Kabul and the country was plunged into a civil war. Failure to establish an 
interim Afghan government after the Soviet withdrawal had major consequences with 
regard to events in Afghanistan in the following decade. The question arises, “Why were 
the Afghan Mujahideen, despite defeating Soviet forces, unable to establish a government 
in Kabul?” It is argued that the Geneva Accord was the major cause, i.e., it had very 
limited objective of ensuring withdrawal of Soviet forces. It did not address the issue of 
replacing the Communist regime with an interim government in Afghanistan. Moreover, 
after the Soviet withdrawal, U.S. apathy and shortsighted policies in the region added to 
the fragile situation of war-torn Afghanistan.  
This chapter begins by giving the historical background of the Soviet Union’s 
involvement in Afghanistan.  This will be followed by threat perception and the response 
of the international community, especially by the United States.  Subsequently, Pakistan’s 
policy options to counter the Soviet threat will be discussed in detail. The Islamist 
movement in Afghanistan had a major role in mounting resistance against Soviet forces. 
Therefore, the emergence of the Afghan resistance movement, as well as Pakistan’s 
strategy to counter the Soviet threat, will be deliberated. Finally, the chapter will provide 
detailed analysis of the Geneva Accord. 
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B. SOVIET MOTIVATIONS: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The Soviet interests in Afghanistan date back to the Soviet-Afghan Friendship 
Treaty of 1921. The Soviet Union had been the first state to recognize Afghanistan in 
1919, and, as if to repay the favor, Afghanistan was the first neighboring country to 
formally recognize Lenin’s regime.62 Since then, the focal point of Soviet strategy has 
always been to increase her influence in, and dominance over, Afghanistan. The USSR 
has used several methods interactively to achieve this goal. For example, whereas, prior 
to WW II, the focus had been on diplomatic initiatives and economic aid, after the war 
the Soviets expanded their focus to include military assistance and political manipulation. 
Thus, the Soviets were quick to capitalize on Afghanistan's poor socio-economic 
conditions, exploiting them under the guise of economic aid, all the while actually 
cultivating communist regimes in the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). 
These openings, along with the trade and transit disruptions by Pakistan during its 
troubles with the Pushtunistan situation, made it possible for the USSR to re-establish its 
economic relationship with Afghanistan.63  
Such an analysis suggests that Soviet efforts in Afghanistan have always been 
intentional; i.e., elements of an overall plan, rather than being ad hoc.64 For example, the 
Soviet construction plan in Afghanistan had been centered on northern Afghanistan, 
containing the roads that go from Termez to Kabul, and from Kusha through the heart of 
Kandahar, all being outfitted to military standards.65 Also, the Soviets built the Salang 
Tunnel through the Hindu Kush, linking northern Afghanistan with the rest of the 
country. Moreover, major airfields were built or improved at Begram, Shindand, and 
Kabul. This infrastructure development plan was directly in-line with the Soviet Union’s 
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long-term objectives in Afghanistan, all suggesting that the Soviets had already deemed it 
necessary to occupy the country.66  
In the field of military assistance, the Soviets modernized the Afghan armed 
forces along Red Army lines, providing sizable military aid to Afghanistan. This aid 
included tanks, jet aircraft and other vital military equipment. In July 1956, a $32.4 
million arms deal with the Soviet was reached, bringing the Soviet military assistance in 
Afghanistan to a total of $1.25 billion, the equivalent of almost the sum amount of Soviet 
economic aid to Afghanistan. Furthermore, the Afghan military made Russian the 
technical language of their armed forces, and during the period, some 3700 Afghan 
officers and cadets received training in Soviet Union.67 This led to the gradual 
“Sovietization” of the Afghan armed forces. Training programs in the USSR provided the 
Soviet intelligence services with an opportunity to subvert and indoctrinate Afghan 
officers; officers who would later make possible the success of the 1978 Communists 
coup. Thus, by 1978 the Afghan armed forces were transformed, their capability also 
being well known by the Soviets.  
By the time Daoud overthrew King Zahir Shah in 1973, thus declaring himself 
president, the Soviets had penetrated well into the internal politics of Afghanistan, 
providing support and assistance to the revolutionary PDPA. By 1976, Daoud appeared to 
have realized that the Soviets had their own agenda in Afghanistan. Thus, to counter-
balance Soviet influence, he embarked on efforts to improve relations with Pakistan, Iran 
and other Muslim countries.68 This policy did not please Moscow or the PDPA.69 This 
culminated in the “Saur Revolution,” and on April 27, 1978 Daoud and members of his 
family were murdered. Nur Mohammad Tukai was installed as president after the 
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assassination.70 Moscow was then the first to recognize the Communist regime in 
Afghanistan.71
The Afghan PDPA soon faced a national rebellion when the ‘mullahs’ and 
‘khans’ declared jihad, or holy war, against the Communists, being predominantly led by 
Islamists leaders such as Gulbuddin Hikmetyar, Burhanuddin Rabbni and Ahmed Shah 
Masud, all of whom were later to lead Mujahideen. By late 1979, it was clear that the 
PDPA regime would fall without Soviet support. Thus, on Christmas Day in 1979, the 
first of some eighty-thousand Soviet troops entered Afghanistan. This direct military 
intervention by the USSR transformed the Afghan war into a regional, and even global, 
geo-political struggle, having ramifications that far exceeded the devastation it brought to 
Afghanistan, alone. 
C. THREAT PERCEPTION: GLOBAL AND REGIONAL 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan brought forth an entirely new situation, not 
only for Pakistan, but also for regional, and even extra-regional, countries. The global 
ambitions and the expansionist nature of the Soviet brand of communism had caused 
deep apprehensions in the capitalist West, as well as in Islamic countries, for a long time. 
The invasion of Afghanistan was not an isolated development, but part of a chain, 
wherein Soviet-inspired communism was seizing control in one country after another. 
Thus, it might have seemed that Afghanistan could be annexed, just as had so many other 
member states of the Soviet Republic.72  
The Soviet invasion revived fears of the long-dreaded Soviet expansion towards 
the warm waters. There was a manifold increase in the global importance of the region 
with the discovery of oil reserves in the Gulf region. The reality was that the 
uninterrupted flow of oil from the Gulf to the rest of the world was of vital strategic 
interest to the West, as Afghanistan was only 500 km away from the Persian Gulf. Thus, 
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it was felt that the supply of oil could easily be impeded from here, and the invasion of 
Afghanistan was perceived in Washington as a geo-strategic threat. The downfall of the 
pro-Western government in Iran, being replaced by an anti-American fundamentalist 
Islamic regime, further heightened the American sense of regional insecurity in the 
area.73 What is commonly known as the “President Carter Doctrine” declared that “an 
attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as 
an assault on the vital interests of United States and such an assault would be repelled by 
any means necessary, including military force”.74 Arguably, many Arabs were as 
apprehensive of this, as they were of Soviet movement in their region. 
1. Impact on Pakistan 
In the immediate context, Pakistan, a strategically located country, became 
vulnerable to communist expansion. Keeping in view their historically rough relationship 
with both Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had 
direct, wide-ranging and far-reaching impacts upon Pakistan’s internal and external 
security.75 Earlier, Afghan armed forces were too week to pose any serious threat to 
Pakistan, and Bhutto, and later Zia, could pursue their Afghan Policy by themselves, 
without the support of any outside power. But now, with Soviet forces within striking 
range of Pakistan, the situation warranted serious attention. According to Mr. Abdul 
Sattar, ex-Foreign Minister of Pakistan, 
The Soviet military intervention provoked a deep sense of alarm in 
Pakistan. Suddenly the buffer disappeared and if the Soviet ruler 
consolidated their control in Afghanistan they could use it as springboard 
to reach the warm waters of the Arabian Sea. Pakistan could not afford to 
acquiesce in the Soviet intervention. But neither could it afford a 
confrontation with a super power.76  
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Another negative impact of the Soviet invasion was that Pakistan was 
continuously suffering from economic and demographic pressure due to the influx of 
Afghan refugees, which by 1982 had reached 3.2 million.  
2. The Response of the International Community  
As Western countries concerns, particularly those of the United States, converged 
with Pakistani interests in getting the Soviet forces out of Afghanistan, their common 
strategy became premised on the notion that raising the costs of occupation might compel 
Moscow to consider withdrawing.77 Consequently, the United States and Saudi Arabia, 
supported by Japan and many other countries, decided to extend all their support to 
Pakistan of which they were physically able in order to assist the growing popular 
resistance to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. In this way, the United States’ 
objectives were also being achieved, without them having to commit all of its own forces 
in the region. Therefore, Pakistan, because of its geographical proximity to Afghanistan, 
emerged as the linchpin of the increased American military presence in the region. For 
Pakistan, on the one hand, the situation created challenges in having to face and engage 
an ideologically hostile super power that was standing right on its doorstep. On the other 
hand, however, it also created an opportunity for it to redress old security concerns by 
neutralizing previous bitter experiences with Afghanistan as well as not letting any other 
party directly intervene and exploit the situation for its own advantage.  
D. POLICY OPTIONS FOR PAKISTAN 
In December 1979, Pakistan had three immediate options to deal with the Afghan 
issue.78 First, it could acquiesce, accepting the Soviet invasion as a fait accompli. Second,  
it could provide all-out military support to the freedom fighters, thus helping them to 
achieve their objectives of eliminating an adversary by force. Third, with the assistance 
of United States, Europe and Islamic countries, it could bring political pressure to bear on 
the Soviet Union, along with covertly assisting the Mujahideen.  
As for the first option, Pakistan would never have been comfortable with Russian 
soldiers deployed along the Pak-Afghan border, even if it was assured that they would 
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not attack Pakistan. Indirectly, it may have thought it could still become a target of the 
KGB, who could instigate an insurgency within Pakistan, easily, by using dissident 
elements and exiled politicians to raise ethnic issues and territorial sensitivities. With the 
Indo-Soviet treaty of 1971 in hand, India could use a Soviet-controlled Afghanistan to stir 
up trouble on Pakistan’s western borders, thereby forcing it to weaken its eastern frontier 
defenses.  
Regarding the military option, Pakistan had certain limitations. For example, 
Soviet troops were already well within Afghanistan, and any military confrontation, 
without any guarantee of protection form major powers, like United States or China, 
could have threatened the security of Pakistan. Moreover, keeping  Pakistan’s 
dependence on foreign assistance clearly in view, even a low intensity conflict, if over a 
long period of time, could likely not have been sustained by Pakistan.  
The only viable option, therefore, was to use all possible diplomatic pressure to 
build up world opinion against the Soviet Union for having violated the principles of the 
UN charter, thereby forcing it to leave Afghanistan.79 At the same time, Pakistan would 
provide humanitarian assistance to the Afghan refugees and the freedom fighters. The 
other determinants of this policy were the Islamic brotherhood,80 and Pakistan’s desires 
to crush Pukhtoon nationalism, to modernize its own army with modern assistance, to 
divert public opinion from domestic problems and to prolong Zia’s regime.81  
This course of action had definite risks for Pakistan, primarily by its confronting 
the Soviet Union. It seemed to be an absolute gamble at that time. The Soviet Union 
repeatedly warned Pakistan of the dire consequences of maintaining their policy. 
However, president Zia saw the Red Army’s entry into Afghanistan as a mortal threat to 
Pakistan and thus, decided “to fight the battle for Pakistan” in Afghanistan.82 In this 
regard, the Afghan Islamists movement leaders were instrumental in organizing the 
Afghan resistance to the Soviet aggression. Subsequently, these same actors were 
involved in a bloody power struggle after the Soviet’s withdrew. Hence, it might be 
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helpful to briefly discuss how the Afghan Islamists movement developed in Afghanistan, 
as well as why Pakistan chose to lend them its support. 
 
E. THE ISLAMISTS MOVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN 
Many Islamists in Afghanistan were intellectuals who had arisen from within the 
government education system, being either from one of the scientific schools, or from the 
state Madrasa. They believed that the only way to come to terms with the modern world, 
as well as the best means of confronting foreign imperialism, was by developing a 
modern, political ideology that was based on Islam.83 The founders of the movement 
known as the “professors,” received their education within the government system, 
completing their studies at Al-Azhar University in Cairo. Later, these professors were on 
the faculty at Kabul and taught theology. Professor Rabbani, and other intellectuals, like 
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Ahmed Shah Massoud, and Sayyaf, were among the founders of 
the movement. The party was formed in late 1958 bearing the name, “Jam’iyyat-i-
Islami,” also known as “Takrik-i-Islami.” The group introduced translations of the works 
of foreign Islamists, such as Sayyad Qutb from Egypt and Maududi from Pakistan, in 
general, presenting Islam as a modern ideology.84  
Islamists were strongly opposed to: the traditionalist way of looking at things, to 
the king, but especially to Daoud. They were also against Pashtun nationalism, as well as 
being opposed to the establishment of an independent Pushtunistan. They protested 
against foreign influence in Afghanistan, be it from the Soviet Union or the West. They 
were also very much opposed to Communism.85 It is important to note that their support 
was limited to towns-- in tribal zones they had virtually no influence.  
Not surprisingly, the Daoud regime (1973 to 1978) regarded the Islamic group to 
be a threat to its own existence. Therefore, when there was an attempted coup of Daoud  
in 1973, it was followed by the arrest, and eventual killing, of many Islamists. For this 
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reason, many of the Islamists leaders fled to Pakistan86. Based in Peshawar, Rabbani and 
Hekmatyar continued their resistance, the group receiving financial support from private 
donors in Saudi Arabia.87 Also, in 1975, with the training and other aid of Pakistan, the 
Afghan Islamists organized a rebellion, though exiled88. However, Daoud was able to 
crush the rebellion. During this period, the movement polarized around Rabbani and 
Hekmatyar. Whereas, the former attracted moderate elements, especially among Persian 
speaking peoples, the latter attracted radicals, especially the Pashtuns. Finally, in 1976-
77, the movement was divided into two factions, namely the Jam’iyyat-i-Islami, led by 
Professor Rabbani and Ahmed Shah Masood, and the Hizb-i-Islami, led by Hekmatyar. 
This would become the most significant division among the Afghan Mujahideen, 
culminating in their struggle for control of Kabul in the mid-1990s. These two parties 
became the largest of the resistance organizations until the emergence of Taliban in 
1994.89
After the failure of the uprising, the surviving movement continued to get support 
from Pakistan, as well as being allowed to open offices in Peshawar. Pakistan’s support 
to the Islamists was not ideological in nature, rather strategic, because the Islamists were 
opposed to Pushtunistan and also rejected the Kabul-Delhi coalition in the name of 
Muslim solidarity. Therefore, the Islamists were perceived, in fact, as defending the 
integrity of Pakistan.90  
In April 1978, when the Communist group took control of Afghanistan, they also, 
like Daoud, focused on the elimination of prominent religious leaders. In response, many 
Islamic Sufi leaders fled the country, forming another nuclei for the resistance, along 
with the Islamists. By the time the Soviet invasion took place, several resistance and 
refugee organizations were already based in Peshawar. The offshoot of these groups was 
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ultimately developed into seven Sunni, political parties in exile, generally headed by 
Islamists leaders.91  
 
F. PAKISTAN’S STRATEGY 
Pakistan’s first line of defense against the Soviet expansion was to strengthen the 
resistance, thus, the hope was that Soviet forces would get bogged down in Afghanistan, 
while trying to maintain control over the supply of weapons to the resistance. They also 
sought to keep the resistance within bounds that would not risk provoking a Soviet 
reaction.92 All of this was to be supported by a retention of  the political initiative. 
To achieve its objectives, Pakistan first had to raise, organize and enable the ill-
equipped Afghans guerrillas to fight effectively. To accomplish this, forces were 
deployed along many fronts, under different local commanders, in a covert fashion. The 
number of major groups that coordinated with the armed struggle from across the borders 
at one time stood at over 150.93 It was no mean achievement to integrate most of them 
into the famous group of seven. All of this required a large amount of training, funds and 
resources, requiring Pakistan to mobilize international support, as well as to equip and 
train its own forces.  
One positive aspect of the Soviet invasion was the renewed interest of the United 
States in Pakistan. Gen Zia made use of this new situation to strengthen his armed forces 
and, in the process, ensure the survival of his own regime. The United States put non-
proliferation issues on the back burner, lifting their arms embargo. A debt of $5.1 billion 
was also rescheduled. As a matter of fact, the earlier tilt towards India by the United 
States was now counter-balanced by it giving equal importance to Pakistan’s security. 
China also declared its full support of Pakistan. So, too, did Saudi Arabia, Egypt and 
other conservative Muslim countries.94 In 1982, President Reagan gave $3.2 billion in aid 
to Pakistan95. In sum Zia got what he wanted.   
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As it became clear that the war would be a protracted one, the U.S. used the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to set up an arms “pipeline” though Pakistan by which 
to funnel aid to resistance groups. Pakistan army directly supervised the transport of most 
of the weapons.96 By the mid-80s, tens of thousands of weapons were being distributed 
by Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) agents to the Mujahideen, via their party warehouses. 
The support for the Jihad was gradually stepped up under the leadership of Gen Akhtar 
Abdul Rehman (head of the ISI).97 Thousands of Afghan guerrillas came to Pakistan to 
get training. From 1980 to 1987, Pakistani Army teams from the ISI went to Afghanistan 
to advise and assist the Mujahideen in their operations. All resistance commanders inside 
Afghanistan were required to join one of the seven Peshawar-based parties, as it was only 
through these parties that arms were distributed. 
Among the seven recognized parties, some were closer to the Pakistani 
establishment than others were. The Islamists section which was particularly favored by 
Pakistan was Hizb (the Hekmatyar party) due to its having close ties with the Pakistani 
Jama’at, both parties being predominantly made up of Pashtuns. However, Pakistan’s 
government, more or less, maintained an even-handed policy towards alliances , wanting 
to maintain unity, and thereby hoping to control the resistance by avoiding any imbalance 
towards Islamists.98  
The role of the ISI increased between 1983 and 1986, leading to a marked 
improvement in the performance of the Afghan resistance. The most significant role 
played by ISI forces was the establishment of the seven-party alliance in 1984. This 
alliance considerably reduced the disunity and chaos in the guerrilla operations inside 
Afghanistan.99 Though the CIA played a role in this, the ISI was at the forefront, giving 
strategic direction to the movement, and controlling operations. The CIA usually relied 
on the ISI and based its information on ISI intelligence units, also allowing the ISI to play 
a major role in policy formulation. Thus, the ISI effectively managed the raising, training, 
 
96 Goodson,  Afghanistan’s Endless War, 61. 
97  Burke, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis,  89. 
98  Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan,  210. 
99 Tanner, Afghanistan,  
39 
                                                
equipping, paying and sending a mercenary army of Islamists volunteers into battle 
against the red Army, though with CIA cooperation and Saudi finances.  
Saudi Arabia generously supported the movement and gave hundreds of 
thousands dollars to assist the resistance movement. Sheikhs, emirs, princes and devout 
businessmen throughout the Gulf region made huge channels for funding, becoming of 
critical importance during the 1990s.100 Thus combined effort forced Moscow to consider 
retreating from Afghanistan. 
1. Pakistan’s Diplomatic Efforts 
Simultaneously, Pakistan worked vigorously at obtaining a diplomatic solution to 
the problem. A resolution condemning the Soviet invasion was adopted by UN General 
Assembly in January 1980 (Appendix ‘A”). Pakistan realized that the world community 
was overwhelmingly against the Soviet invasion, giving it diplomatic strength in their 
Afghan policy. From then on, keeping the number of votes increasing at each UN session 
became an issue of Pakistan’s international credibility. The resolution adopted, being 
retained for the seven years following the 1980 date, attracted ever-greater support, 
increasing from 111 votes in 1980, to 123 in 1987.101  
After hectic diplomatic efforts over the ensuing eight years, on April 14, 1988, the 
historical document was finally signed at Geneva (Attached as Appendix ‘B’). The 
Geneva Accord was a face-saver for the Soviet Union, as it could claim that it pulled out 
of Afghanistan as a result of a negotiated settlement. On the occasion of their signing, 
Pakistan and the United States declared that it did not imply recognition of the regime in 
Kabul. The United States also declared that it reserved the right to provide arms to 
Afghan parties, and restrained should Soviet Union from doing so.102 Subsequent 
developments in Afghanistan proved that these two clauses of the accord would have 
great implications on the future stability of Afghanistan.  
G. ANALYSIS OF GENEVA ACCORD 
This thesis suggests that, in regard to Pakistani interests, it is vital to analyze why 
the Geneva Accord failed to bring an end to the war in Afghanistan. In this regard, three 
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issues must be analyzed in order to see if the results achieved could have safeguarded 
Pakistan’s national interests.  
1. Formation of Interim Government 
The issue of forming an interim political government even before the withdrawal 
of Soviet troops first came up during the eighth round of Geneva talks, in November 
1987. The Soviets proposed that their pull out would take seven to twelve months if there 
was an agreed upon formula for the composition of an interim government. Pakistan and 
the United States both rejected this proposal because it linked the withdrawal to the 
establishment of a provisional administration in Kabul. Subsequently, the Soviets 
dropped the offending clause. However, this may have been a missed opportunity for 
Pakistan. Perhaps General Zia’s decision not to accept the proposal was based on the 
assumption that the Mujahideen would be able to topple the Kabul regime soon after the 
withdrawal of Soviet forces. That is where Pakistan and its intelligence agencies failed, 
as they were unable to assess the military situation more objectively. The Soviet forces 
had dumped so much ammunition into Afghanistan that it proved to be enough for 
Najibullah’s forces to fight a prolonged war against the Mujahideen. Moreover, it 
appeared that the ISI was not aware of the sharp differences that existed among the 
Mujahideen. Thus, Pakistan did not predict the power struggle that would arise among 
different factions of the Mujahideen after the Russian troops had left Afghanistan.103
General Zia was late in realizing that the Mujahideen did not have the ability to 
overthrow Najibullah’s government by force, though contrary to what they had claimed 
earlier. Thus, Zia’s fresh proposal of establishing an interim administration came late in 
the proceedings, nor could he develop a consensus in his own camp, nor with his allies 
(i.e., the United States and other Muslim countries). Moreover, by this time, the Soviet 
leadership had given indication that it would be withdrawing from Afghanistan, even 
without having signed the accord.104  
In hindsight, it has been argued that General Zia’s decision to continue supporting 
the military solution to defeat the Kabul regime (over political alternatives) led to a 
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mishandling of the situation. The final outcome proved very costly for both Pakistan and 
Afghanistan.   
2. Continuation of Arms Support 
The issue came into the discussion in the last sessions of the negotiations. The 
Soviets were not willing to halt its supply of arms to the Kabul regime, which it 
recognized as being a legitimate government. The United States continued to press 
cessation of military aid to both parties. Before signing the accord, Pakistan urged 
simultaneously ending the military assistance being given by both superpowers. Most of 
Afghan leaders were not in favor of this negative kind of symmetry, believing it would 
place them at a great disadvantage, as the Soviets might dump a considerable amount of 
weapons before withdrawing. In the end, both superpowers agreed on a positive 
symmetry, i.e., the USSR and the United States would continue to provide weapons to 
their Afghan allies. This was not at all a satisfactory arrangement, suggesting a 
continuation of the conflict. Therefore, the only way the Mujahideen could have been 
supported was through Pakistan, a direct contradiction of Instrument I of the accord.105  
As a consequence of this clause, the Soviets left behind military hardware worth 
more than one billion dollars to strengthen the Kabul regime. They were even allowed 
use of bases inside the Soviet Union for their air force, from which they flew to take the 
town of Kunduz from the Mujahideen. Thus, even during the withdrawal of Soviet forces, 
the Mujahideen continued to attack the Soviet convoys and the air bases, as Soviets were 
using these for stockpiling arms and ammunition in the guise of supplying food.106 The 
United States continued to support the Mujahideen via Pakistan. However, U.S. aid 
reduced considerably over the period, even stopping temporarily. Meanwhile, the Kabul 
regime intensified their effort to crush the Mujahideen movement, violating Pakistan’s 
borders at will.  Similarly, the Mujahideen continued to fight against the Communist 
regime.  
3. Mujahideen’s Participation 
The main actors on the Afghan stage were the Kabul regime and the Mujahideen, 
while others played supporting roles. When negotiations started, the Kabul regime 
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refused to talk with the Mujahideen. However, this was only their initial reaction. As the 
Mujahideen captured more areas, the Kabul regime may have felt pressured into 
accepting the Mujahideen’s participation. The matter should have been pursued with 
Kabul for Mujahideen inclusion in the talks. The division among Afghan Mujahideen 
groups was another obstacle with which Pakistan had to grapple. Pakistan pursued the 
Mujahideen to form a political front so that the UN could be pressured into the 
negotiation process. However, the two groups remained divided until 1985, at which time 
nominal unity was shown by the Mujahideen groups.107  
H. RESPONSE TO GENEVA ACCORD 
As the Mujahideen had opposed talks from the beginning, they rejected the 
Accord, out-right. Iran-based Mujahideen also rejected the accord, claiming they had not 
been party to it. Due to presence of the United States, Iran did not associate itself with the 
Accord. Meanwhile, both superpowers continued their military support of their allies in 
the war. This made impossible for Pakistan to abide by Article I of the Accord (i.e., 
stating the non-interference in the internal matters of the Afghanistan). According to 
Mattinudin, the “Geneva Accord was therefore, a dead letter ab-initio”.108 Whereas, the 
Geneva Accord achieved the withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan, it was not 
able to fully resolve external dimensions of the conflict, while failing to even touch 
internal issues. Moreover, none of the signatories of the accord were sincere in their 
promise to abide by the terms of the agreement. As described by General Mirza Aslam 
Beg, while discussing Pakistan’s Afghan policy in the 1980s, highlighted the fact that, 
The political dimension of the Afghan conflict was not given adequate 
attention. Emphasis was placed on seeking a military solution and on the 
withdrawal of the Soviets troops from Afghanistan. In depth study and 
serious efforts on promoting an alternative to the Kabul regime was not 
made in time.  
If this was the outcome, the question arises, “Why had Pakistan signed the 
Geneva Accord in its present from?” Probably Pakistan felt that this was their only option 
left. For, even if Pakistan had not signed the Accord, the Soviets would have withdrawn 
their troops, anyway. However, this withdrawal would have been on to the Soviets own 
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schedule, while giving support to the Kabul regime till very end. Furthermore, such a 
withdrawal likely would not have been total, and it would have caused further 
deterioration of relations between Pakistan and the USSR. Moreover, the United States 
had lost interest in Afghanistan after achieving its objective of a Communist roll back.109 
Nor had anyone visualized at that time that Soviet Union would collapse so soon. 
I. CONCLUSION 
Through out the Afghan war, Pakistan was an indispensable party to any effort to 
bring conflict to an end, be they political or military. Whereas, Pakistan’s short-term 
objective had been to secure Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, its long-term interest 
was to have a friendly government installed in Afghanistan. Pakistan was able to achieve 
its first objective, and its Afghan policy won broad-based international sympathy and 
support. The impact of this policy was that Pakistan’s armed forces received state-of-the-
art military hardware. Not only was its potential of withstanding pressure from India 
increased, but funds became available for economical development also. Perhaps more 
importantly, Washington seemed obliged to turn a blind eye towards Pakistan’s nuclear 
program; a nuclear program which had reached the capability of producing weapons by 
1983. These were some of the strategic considerations behind Pakistan’s Afghan 
policy.110 On the negative side, hosting millions of Afghan refugees has put great 
pressure on the country’s economy. Furthermore, the almost constant conditions which 
surrounded the protracted war in Afghanistan gave rise to “warlord-ism,” rather than 
developing real, enduring leadership. It also gave birth to the trends of “Jihad,” religious 
militancy, narcotics trafficking and smuggling. Overall, Pakistan’s Afghan policy, up to 
the signing of the Geneva Accord and the Russian withdrawal, appeared to be a success. 
However, Pakistan failed to achieve its long-term objective of establishing a friendly 
regime in Kabul.  
This failure may have been because there were a couple of major flaws in the 
Geneva Accord. First, there was not a provision for the establishment of an interim 
government in Afghanistan. Second, the continued military support of Najibullah by the 
Soviet Union made it possible for the Communist regime to survive for another three 
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years. Had military support to both parties (i.e., the Mujahideen and Najibullah) dried up, 
the outcome might have been different, as suggested, for example, by the collapse of 
Najibullah’s regime on April 16, 1992, within three months of the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union. It was probably too ambitious for Pakistan to have demanded so much 
from a superpower who had lost interest in the region, as well as perhaps also being 
beyond its capability. 
Notwithstanding the aforementioned, no credit should be taken away from 
Pakistan because it had to work within many political constraints. Among other things, 
these included the interests of those who were giving Pakistan aid, the threat of the Soviet 
Union, the presence of millions of Afghan refugees and keeping unity among the 
Mujahideen groups. To maintain equilibrium with so many divergent interests, while 
coming out successfully at the conclusion, was not an ordinary feat with such a crisis in 
the region.  
After the Soviet withdrawal, it was Pakistan’s long-term objective that made 
Pakistan’s Afghan policy-makers strive to continue their involvement in Afghanistan. ISI 
remained committed to installing a pro-Pakistan Islamists government in Kabul. As a 
result, the hard liners in the ISI and the Army were in a stronger position than ever 






IV. PAKISTAN’S AFGHANISTAN POLICY: POST SOVIET 




Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union appeared 
confused, and it has been criticized for its failure to play a positive role in bringing about 
a lasting solution to the Afghan problem. The regime installed by Moscow under 
Najibullah fought for three more years, finally collapsing in April 1992, after which a 
bloody power struggle ensued among Mujahideen parties competing against each other 
for the right to rule Afghanistan. As such, Afghan leaders could not develop a consensus 
in the formation of a unified government in Kabul. Pakistan attempted to bring some 
unity among the warring factions through the Peshawar and the Islamabad accords, but 
both failed to achieve the full compliance of the Afghan leaders.  
Since the Soviet withdrawal, a number of factors came into play that made the 
Afghanistan’s situation highly complicated. Perhaps the most salient factors are the 
failure of the international community to install an interim Afghan government (due to an 
ill-conceived Geneva Accord), the U.S. policy of distancing itself from the region, and 
the subsequently collapse of the Soviet Union, all conspired together to create a political 
vacuum in the region. Additionally, the emergence of the new Central Asian Republics 
(CARs), each arising as a consequence of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, brought 
about political and economic changes in the region, further aggravating the situation.  
Consequently, the factional fighting among the Mujahideen groups created an 
opportunity for external elements, this time from Iran, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, as well as 
from Russia, each having its own interests in Afghanistan. Not surprisingly, this created 
conflicts of interest among the regional and global contenders, leading to a civil war in 
the region, and culminating in the emergence of the Taliban in 1994. By supporting the 
Taliban, Pakistan hoped to accomplish several things. For example, it desired to redress 
its security issues relative to India, curb Pashtun nationalism, and create a corridor for 
trade with Central Asia. For a short time, the Taliban regime did serve Pakistan’s 
objectives. But Pakistan, due to its support for the Taliban regime, gradually found itself 
isolated from the rest of the international community, ultimately ending up being 
46 
embarrassed by having to take U-turn in its Taliban policy after the events of September 
2001.  
 This chapter will seek to answer the question: “Why was Pakistan’s Afghanistan 
policy unable to help bring a lasting solution to the Afghanistan crisis?” To fully 
comprehend the situation during the period between 1989 to 2001, this thesis has further 
divided the period into three phases: 1)1989-1992, 2) 1992-1994, and 3) 1994-2001. Each 
phase is marked by major changes in regard to the internal political situation of 
Afghanistan, and the corresponding changes in Pakistan’s strategies to achieve its 
objectives. After discussing these phases, the international response to the Taliban regime 
will be deliberated, focusing on the United States and Pakistan’s policy towards the 
Taliban. In conclusion, a critical analysis of Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy will be given.  
B. POST SOVIET WITHDRAWAL PERIOD 
The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan came as a relief for the world, in 
general, and for Pakistan, in particular. However, the war involving the Mujahideen was 
not over, rather it entered into the phase of civil war. For Pakistan, too, the Jihad 
continued, as Pakistan’s objective of toppling Najibullah’s regime was yet to be achieved. 
From this point onward, it was no longer a struggle to get the Russian out of Afghanistan, 
but a civil war was being waged between the Kabul regime and the forces that opposed it. 
Since 1989, the struggle for power in Afghanistan has gone through different phases. 
These phases can be divided in the following periods:- 
- Phase I (1989 to 1992) The Mujahideen struggle to remove Najibullah’s 
regime  
- Phase II (1992 to 94) The Mujahideen’s struggle for power amongst 
themselves 
- Phase III (1994-2001) The rise and fall of the Taliban 
 
1. Phase I (1989 to 1992): The Mujahideen Struggle to Remove 
Najibullah’s Regime 
After the withdrawal of the Soviet Union, it was believed that the Soviet puppet 
government in Kabul would be overcome in a matter of days. The Mujahideen, with the 
assistance of Pakistan, formed an Afghan Interim Government (AIG) in Feb 1989, 
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consisting of leaders from seven parties.111 The next stage, the ISI believed, was to seize 
a city that could act as a seat for the new administration. Once the Mujahideen were 
installed on Afghanistani soil, they hoped, the resistance of the Kabul regime would 
collapse. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto sanctioned the launch of an ill-conceived 
military campaign to capture Jalalabad. In March 1989, massed fighters from almost 
every faction attacked Jalalabad. The battle for Jalalabad turned out to be disastrous for 
the Mujahideen. It now appears that the ISI had made a catastrophic miscalculation, the 
assault was poorly organized, not only, there was factional in fighting and a lack of 
supplies but also there were tactical inadequacies. As a result, more, than 1000 
Mujahideen were killed, with several thousand being injured. On the other hand, the 
Kabul regime received a big boost. The defeat had strategic implications for the 
Mujahideen, as many countries, including Pakistan, would have recognized the (Afgan 
Interim Government) AIG, had Jalalabad fell.112 Pakistan’s Afghan policy also changed 
after the Mujahideen’s failure to capture Jalalabad. Without totally losing faith in the 
AIG, Islamabad began to search for political solutions to the problem, also. An example 
of this was the removal of Maj Gen  Hamid Gul as the ISI chief.113
In fact, the Mujahideen were unable to defeat Najibullah’s regime until April 
1992 for two major reasons. The first reason was that the Soviet arms support to 
Najibullah’s regime continued, whereas the U.S. arms support to the Mujahideen had 
declined appreciably. Soviet aid approached $300 million in 1989. By contrast, U.S. aid 
to the Mujahideen dropped to $ 40-50 millions per year in the 1980s.114 The United 
States had, indeed, lost a great deal of interest in the conflict. Whereas, it had 
successfully helped block Soviet aggression, subsequently, neither the U.S. public, nor 
the U.S. government had any enthusiasm in regards to the Afghan civil war.115   
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The second major reason for the continuation of the Afghan conflict was the 
inability of the Afghan resistance to demonstrate a credible alternative to what was 
already being offered. The AIG was doomed by the perpetual bickering of the Peshawar 
party leaders (who were its primary participants). The Shia minority was excluded from 
playing a role in the AIG, as they were the major resistance commanders inside 
Afghanistan. The AIG split apart in late 1989, divided by internecine violence between 
the forces of Hekmatyar and Massoud.116  
Subsequently, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 proved to be fatal for 
Najibullah. Deprived of Soviet arms, money, and diplomatic support, he had no 
alternative, but to leave power in April 1992. Soon thereafter, a struggle for the 
succession began among the Mujahideen parties.  
2. Phase II (1992–94) Mujahideen’s Struggle for Power   
The resignation of Najibullah created a power vacuum, and there was no 
government, at all, for one week. Major warlords, Hekmatyar, Masood, and Dostum had 
their eyes set on Kabul, and much bloodshed was expected. This, however, was averted 
by Pakistan’s timely mediation. Pakistan played a key role in bringing Afghanistan out of 
this power vacuum. Talks between the Mujahideen leaders and Pakistani Government 
began in Peshawar.  
An interim government was formed based on the April 1992 Peshawar Accord. 
All the parties’ leaders signed the accord, excluding Hekmatyar. Pakistani officials 
maintained a neutral stance, because the friction between Pushtun and non-Pushtun 
parties could have cast shadows on the NWFP and Baluchistan. It was decided that for 
two months Mujadadi would be the acting President, to be followed by Rabbani for four 
months. At the end of the six months, Shoora would be held to choose the government for 
the next eighteen months, after which time elections would be held. It is ironic that while 
the talks were going on, the forces of Hekmatyar and Mosood were fighting for control of 
the capital.117 The internecine fighting was expected, as those knocking at the doors of 
Kabul belonged to different tribal groups of religiously oriented political parties, each 
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having distrust of the others.118 The power struggle was typical of the intra-Afghan 
character, i.e., with no heed being given to any external counsel. In the race to capture 
Kabul, Rabbani and Masood forces were the first among other Afghan contenders to 
acquire power in the center. This had serious implications for the future of peace in 
Afghanistan.119
In June 1992, Mujadadi reluctantly, but peacefully, handed over power to 
Rabbani, whose interim government was to rule for four months. The new government 
relied on Masood and Dostum’s forces to maintain military control of Kabul. 
Hekmaytyar bombarded the city with rockets, denouncing the government as being a 
communist regime in disguise. Rabbani precipitated the crisis when he refused to step 
down from the office of president, as per the Peshawar accord, after four months tenure, 
and, in December 1992, was elected president by a false Shoora that was dominated by 
his supporters.120 Afghan society was completely divided over the Shoora. Hekmatyar, 
who was offered the seat of prime minister, refused to share power with Rabbani, 
maintaining that Rabbani’s government had no legality. Hekmatyar termed it to be an act 
of war against other organizations.  
Pakistan then started new mediatory efforts to enable the warring Afghan leaders 
to resolve their differences. While heavy fighting was going on in Kabul, on March 1, 
1993, eight major party leaders reached an agreement in Islamabad to allow Rabbani to 
finish an 18 month tenure as president, with Hekmatyar as prime minister and Masood as 
defense minister. The Saudi and Iranian governments, as well as several Afghan groups, 
were also invited, making it an joint peace effort.121  
Although the Islamabad accord was signed in solemn ceremonies in  Saudi Arabia 
, it was never implemented. The cabinet to be formed by Hekmatyar was not accepted. 
He demanded removal of Masood from the post of Defense Minister, which was not 
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agreed upon. The country, again, plunged into civil war. Fighting flared repeatedly 
between groups who allied themselves with each other in various constantly shifting 
positions, and mainly along ethnic lines. For example, Pushtuns in the South, Uzbeks and 
Tajiks in the North and Shi’a Hazaras in the center battled each other. There were also 
repeated incidents of Russian forces shelling Afghan territory, or attacking Afghanistan 
from Tajikistan.122   
Following Rabbani’s re-election as President in June 1994, Islamabad accused the 
Afghan leader of perpetuating his power illegally. The relation between Afghanistan and 
Pakistan deteriorated when the Pakistani embassy was attacked with rockets by anti-
Pakistani protesters. To add to this, Rabbani started developing relations with India, 
evoking a bitter response from Islamabad.123  
After the withdrawal of Russian troops, the worst period in Afghan history began, 
the state-society relationship having completely broken down. There was no central rule, 
no mechanism for exercising state power, and no security. At this point, Afghanistan was 
in a state of virtual disintegration, the country being divided into warlord fiefdoms. 
Rabbani was controlling Kabul, Ismael Khan was controlling Heart, Mazar-e-Sharif was 
under Dostum, the south-eastern districts were controlled by Hikmatyar, etc.124 Up until 
this time, the actual faces of almost all the Afghan leaders had been given exposure to 
their nation. However, now they witnessed their leaders making and breaking alliances 
almost overnight. These Afghan leaders were either incapable, or unwilling, to put things 
back on the right track. Not one of them proved to be trustworthy, failing even to fulfill 
the promise made in the Holy Kaaba. Afghanistan had almost become a failed state, as 
the writ of the government did not even extend its reach to its own capital city.125  
All the while, the international community seemed to have lost interest. The only 
active players were the Iranians, the Russians and the Pakistanis, as each vying for 
influence and the furtherance of its own agenda (including ethnic and other interests), 
while caring little for the welfare of the Afghans. Amidst this turmoil in Afghanistan, a 
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reactionary movement emerged from Kandhar, attracting enormous support from the 
tired Afghan population. The leaders of this movement called themselves the Taliban.  
3. Phase III (1994 To 2001) the Taliban Regime 
The Taliban consisted of poor, Afghan students, who had been educated in 
Pakistan's religious schools. Their objective was to assist the Afghan Mujahideen in 
evicting Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Many of them were orphans of the so-called 
‘Afghan Jihad’. They rallied around Mullah Omar, a former Mujahid, reacting against the 
chaos that had followed the Mujahideen victory, while blaming currently existing Afghan 
leaders for bringing death and destruction to their homeland.126  
The Taliban’s first, large military operations took place in October 1994, when it 
seized the Pasha munitions depot, and the town of Spin Boldak, situated on the Pakistani 
border. Spin Boldak was held by Hekmetyar’s group at the time. The capture of arms 
provided them with an enormous quantity of military material, including rockets, 
ammunition, artillery and small arms. Thereafter, the Taliban took control of Kandhar 
without any resistance. By December 1994, the Taliban had spread to the northern and 
eastern outskirts of Kabul, towards the strategic town of Heart.127 Within three months, 
the Taliban had taken control of twelve provinces, opening the road to traffic and 
disarming the population. As the Taliban marched north to Kabul, local warlords either 
fled or surrendered to them. Mullah Omar and his army of students were on the march 
across Afghanistan. During this time, the Taliban met with phenomenal military success, 
including the capture of several important cities, like Heart in 1995, Jalalabad and Kabul 
in 1996, Kunduz in 1997. They also captured Mazar-I-Sharif in May 1997, and after 
losing it, recaptured of Mazar-I-Sharif in August 1998, as well as capturing Bamiyan in 
September 1998.128 By the year 2000, about 90% of Afghanistan was under Taliban rule, 
and they held 27 out of 29 provinces. The only group posing any resistance to the Taliban 
were the Tajiks, but this was only in the north.  
C. PAKISTAN’S GOALS AND STRATEGIES 
For security reasons, having a friendly government in Afghanistan has been 
Pakistan’s long-held desire. However, the emergence of CARs after the collapse of the  
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Soviet Union brought renewed interest into the region. Successive Pakistani governments 
were anxious to open up direct land routes for trade with the Central Asian Republics. 
Ever since the withdrawal of the Soviet Union, Pakistan had been looking for such an 
environment. Among existing Afghan leaders, Hekmatyar, being Pushtun was felt to be 
the leading figure, over other warlords. Therefore, Pakistan had aimed to place 
Hekmatyar in power in Kabul in order to have a friendly government in Afghanistan.129 
Although Pakistan had hoped to establish a friendly regime in Kabul, the record shows 
that whenever the question of peace and settlement in Afghanistan came up, Pakistan had 
always cooperated in the settlement of the crisis. This is proven by its roles in brokering 
the 1992 and 1993 Accords, where Pakistan promoted the acceptance of Rabbani, a non-
Pushtun, as president.130  
By the end of 1994, Pakistani policy makers realized that Pakistan’s hope of 
having a friendly Afghan government was unlikely to come true. Moreover, Pakistan was 
tired of backing Hekmatyar, who was losing ground militarily, and the continuous nature 
of the war was having a negative impact on the socio-economic life of Pakistan. The 
drugs, Kalashnikovization and the heavy burdens associated with hosting Afghan 
refugees were all growing threats to the internal security of the country. Under these 
circumstances, not only did Islamabad view the rise of the Taliban as increasing the 
prospects of bringing peace to the region, but also many members of international 
community saw things similarly.  
1. Pakistan’s Support of the Taliban  
Pakistan impressed by the Taliban’s success in suppressing unruly Mujahideen 
commanders and imposing peace in and around Kandhar, decided to encourage the 
Taliban as an alternative to the Rabbani regime (which also had established links with the 
Indians).131 Bhutto’s interior minister, Maj Gen. Naseerullah Babar, considered the 
Taliban to be a perfect tool for Pakistan in opening up trade routes into Central Asia; 
routes that had been blocked by all the turmoil in Afghanistan. To coordinate its 
assistance to the Taliban, an Afghan Cell was created in the Ministry. The ISI provided 
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transportation, fuel, communications equipment and advice to the Taliban movement.132 
The Taliban also enjoyed support from Pakistani religious elements. For example, the 
Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam of Fazal ul Rehman, as well as the famous Akora Khattak 
madrassa (headed by Maulana Semi-ul-Haq) all lent their support.133 In regards to their 
funding, the duties imposed on trucks transiting Afghanistan from Pakistan became the 
Taliban’s most important official source of income. In addition, smuggling, and 20% of 
the income of poppy dealers, went to Taliban accounts.134 Arab terrorist financier, Osama 
bin Laden, and the U.S. oil company of California (Unocal) have also been instrumental 
in providing funds for the Taliban.135  
Pakistan accorded the Taliban diplomatic recognition on May 25, 1997 after 
Mazar-i-Sharif had fallen to the Taliban for the first time, when the movement appeared 
to be on the verge of conquering all of northern Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia and the United 
Arab Emirates followed the suit two days later.136
Politically, by recognizing the Taliban regime, Pakistan opted for an ‘open play’ 
and high-risk policy with regard to Afghanistan. In taking this initiative, Pakistan did not 
consider the reactions of its neighbors. For example, Iran, a traditionally close friend, was 
never happy with the Taliban. Official recognition by Pakistan further widened the gulf 
between these two countries, with Iran eventually asking India to do everything in its 
power to help stem the crisis in Afghanistan. The policy also caused deep resentment in 
the CAR countries; many of whom Pakistan had hoped to engage in lucrative commercial 
deals. As a consequence, and because of its refusal to rein in both the Taliban and 
Pakistan’s Islamic parties, CAR states started to ignore Pakistan. These states started to 
look towards Iran, Turkey, Azerbaijan and even Russia, as potentially being their partners 
in the development of their oil and gas pipelines for export.137 Additionally, by 
recognizing the Taliban, Pakistan gave preference to the Pushtuns, thereby losing any 
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hope of a peace settlement with Rabbani, Masood and even Hekmetyar for if their Policy 
fails.   
D. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY’S REACTION AND THE FALL 
OF THE TALIBAN  
The Taliban had an extreme interpretation of the Sharia, or Islamic law that 
appalled many Afghans, and the Muslim world. They not only closed down all girls’ 
schools, but women were virtually eliminated from public space by being forbidden to 
work outside of the home. They also banned every conceivable kind of entertainment. 
The Taliban’s brand of Islamic fundamentalism was so extreme that it appeared to 
denigrate Islam’s message of peace and tolerance, as well as its propensity to co-exist 
with other religious and ethnic groups.138  
The Taliban’s enforcement of such practices sent ideological shock waves 
throughout the region. Few Islamic countries endorsed the Taliban version of the Sharia 
law, but most considered this matter to be an internal affair. Iran openly denounced the 
Taliban regime, considering them to have been the creation of the United States and 
Saudi Arabia in order to contain Iran. Moscow’s opposition to the Taliban appeared 
based on the apprehension that, with their religious zeal, they would pose a threat to the 
internal stability of the Central Asian Republics.139 Iran found that its own interest 
coincided with Central Asia and the Russian federation, making an alliance with them 
against the Pushtun Sunni Taliban movement. Henceforth, Afghanistan became a pawn in 
the hands of regional and extra regional actors such as, Iran, Turkey, India, and Russia. 
Furthermore, four of the CAR nations backed the anti-Taliban, Northern Alliance with 
arms and money. By contrast, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia backed the Taliban.140  
As the Taliban were being isolated from other regional countries, Pakistan put 
forward a peace formula, with the aim to allay the fears of Iran and the Central Asian 
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countries regarding the Taliban.141 Simultaneously, Pakistan persuaded the Taliban to 
accept a broad-based government in Kabul; one in which all major ethnic tribes would 
share power. The Taliban, however, refused to accept any such formula in which they 
were to share the power with the Northern Alliance, who controlled less than 10% of 
territory at the time. This was an indication to Pakistan that the Taliban had transformed 
themselves, from being a subservient political client, into an independent regime and, 
thus, it may no longer be possible for a Pakistan to manage the Taliban, as it could lead to 
anarchy on its side.142 The Taliban, to reduce their dependence on Pakistan and to get 
some autonomy, began cultivating close ties with Osama-bin-Laden. He set up a private 
base near Jalalabad in 1990, not only supporting the Taliban financially, but also sending 
several hundred Arab-Afghans to participate in Taliban military campaigns in North.143 
Due to bin Laden’s terrorist activities, the Taliban came under intense international 
pressure, the UN even imposing sanctions in November 1999. However, these sanctions 
did not force the Taliban to give up bin Laden. New sanctions imposed in December 
2000, these being in response to an attack on the USS Cole in the port of Aden, also 
failed to work.144  
Pakistan, now realizing that it was being isolated due to its Afghan policy, 
downgraded its recognition of the Taliban in 1998 under pressure from the United 
States.145 The September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States presented Pakistan with 
a difficult choice: either it had to join the United States in its war against bin Laden’s al-
Qaeda network, or it had to persist with its pro-Taliban Afghan policy and, as a 
consequence, continue to suffer condemnation by the international community, seeming 
guilty by association with bin Laden’s al-Qaeda network. The Taliban, though starting 
out as an asset for Pakistan, had now become a strategic liability. The logical response 
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appeared to be to keep the security and integrity of Pakistan of paramount importance. 
Therefore, Pakistan had to take a U-turn in its Afghan policy.  
E. THE UNITED STATES’ TALIBAN POLICY 
Washington had always regarded Afghanistan as being an area of Soviet interest. 
Following the Soviet’s physical involvement in Afghanistan, the United States had been 
very happy to see the Soviets bleed there, thus scoring a diplomatic victory over the 
Soviet Union. However, after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, the United States appeared 
to have lost interest in Afghanistan, having withdrawn from the scene, and leaving 
warring Afghan factions to fight amongst themselves. “The United States shared 
responsibility for what happened to Afghanistan after the Soviets left”, wrote Anthony 
Lewis, in The International Herald Tribune.    
The independence of the Central Asian states, with their rich oil and gas fields, 
combined with the interests of Pakistan and Iran in Afghanistan, revived American 
interests there.146 On November 18, 1996, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, Robin 
Raphel, stated that “the Taliban are a completely indigenous movement…and that, even 
though their policies reflect extremism, the best way to moderate them is to engage 
them”.147 Two motives behind the United States’ initial encouragement allegedly given 
to the Taliban stand out: First, the Taliban was anti-Iranian and pro-Western in their 
orientation; Second, the United States wanted to check the influence of Russia in Central 
Asian States by giving alternatives trade routes through Afghanistan (e.g., a case in point 
was the Taliban’s backing of the UNOCAL project by the U.S. government). At one point 
in time, the U.S. State Department even declared that it would establish diplomatic 
relations with the Taliban. However, the announcement was soon retracted.148 All this 
was done while some of the highest officials of the United States were visiting 
Afghanistan and talking to the Taliban. Similarly, Taliban delegates also visited the 
United States, giving the impression that the United States was supporting the Taliban.149
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Subsequently, commencing in late 1997, the U.S. policy turned against the 
Taliban because of their behavior toward women. On May 5, 1999 the U.S. Senate passed 
S.Res 68, calling on President Bush not to recognize any Afghan government that 
discriminated against women.150 Thereafter, the Unites States’ relations with the Taliban 
further deteriorated when they provided support to bin Laden and refused to accept a 
broad based government in Kabul. Terrorist attacks on the United States on September 
11, 2001 shocked the entire world, the Bush administration attributing it to Osama-bin-
Laden and his organization, Al-Qaeda. The United States quickly worked to gather 
international momentum, embarking upon a military operation against Afghanistan on 
October 7, 2001. Within two months, the Taliban were routed and their regime came to an 
end. 
F. ANALYSIS OF PAKISTAN’S AFGHAN POLICY 
Ever since the power struggle between the rival Afghan militia began, Pakistan’s 
objectives have been:151
- To help obtain a friendly government across its western border. It was 
thought that a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan would give Pakistan 
‘Strategic Depth’ against India.152
- To gain access to Central Asian markets. 
- To gain a safe route for oil and gas pipeline from Turkimanstan to the 
Arabian sea. 
- The repatriation of Afghan refugees. 
Pakistan was unable to achieve any of its above mentioned objectives; a failure 
which could be attributed to flaws in its Afghan policy, as well as to other contributing 
factors. Taken together, this made it difficult for Pakistan to achieve its goals. This will 
be discussed in the following paragraphs.  
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1. Flaws in Pakistan’s Afghan Policy 
When analysis of Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy is done in hindsight, one can find 
a number of flaws during this period. These are listed below:- 
a. Pakistan’s Afghan policy was based on the wrong assumptions.153 That is, 
after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, and once Najibullah was 
forced to quit, Pakistan assumed that the Afghan factions would be able to establish a 
stable government. Similarly, when the Taliban appeared on the radar, Pakistan hoped 
that if its full support was given to the Taliban in overthrowing Rabbani, they would be 
able to capture power and Pakistan would be able to reach out to the CARs. Pakistan also 
assumed that a Taliban dominated government in Kabul would be permanently friendly 
towards Pakistan, would recognize the Durand Line, and curb Pushtun nationalism. But 
the Taliban not only refused to recognize Durand Line, but also did not agree to drop 
Afghanistan’s claim to Pushtunistan. Rather, fugitives from Pakistan openly lived in 
Afghanistan during Taliban rule.154 Dr Eqbal opined that inadvertently, Islamabad was 
setting the stage for the emergence of a powerful Pushtunistan movement.155  
b. After Soviet withdrawal, Pakistan should have minimized the role of ISI in 
Afghan affairs, the foreign office only being given the basic responsibility of policy 
formulation. In fact, civilian leadership had very little control over the Pakistan’s Afghan 
policy.  
c. Pakistan’s internal, political instability also contributed to its failure to 
form any long-term Afghan policy. Between the time of President Zia’s death in 1988 
and 2001, a span of 13 years, a total of five changes of government took place in 
Pakistan. For the first time, it was apparent that Pakistan’s Afghan policy and its 
domestic policy were not coordinated, having an adverse affect on the outcome of its 
Afghan policy. Consequently, there was a lack of coordination between different 
departments having anything to do with Afghan affairs. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
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(barely involved in Afghan policy), ISI and the Ministry of Interior often made 
independent decisions, without consulting each other first.156 A case in point during 
Benazir Bhutto’s time in Pakistan occurred when General Babar, acting as head of 
Ministry of Interior, was deliberately cutting out the ISI and the Army of policy-making 
decisions because these groups were considered to have supporters from Zia’s era. On the 
political front, Bhutto leaned towards Jammat-e-Ulema-Islam in order to out-duel Sharif, 
Hizb-e-Islami (Hekmatyar) and Jammat-e-Islami. Therefore, as such, ISI and Ministry of 
Interior were following their own Afghan policies.157 The result was a lack of coherence 
in policy.  
d. Knowing the history of Afghanistan, as well as the national characteristics 
of Afghans, leads to the expectation that too much involvement in the internal affairs of 
Afghanistan tends to raise the reaction level of other groups. Moreover, to rely on one 
group to achieve long-term objectives may have been a wrong policy to be followed in 
Afghanistan. It ended up being counter-productive, as those not favored by Pakistan 
remained unfriendly to it, even after some solution to the Afghan problems was found. 
Perhaps Pakistan should have been content with having an independent, integrated and 
friendly western neighbor, irrespective of which political faction or ethnic community 
was in power.158  
e. Pakistan should have worked through the United Nations, rather than 
getting directly involved in trying to bring about a broad-based government in 
Afghanistan. Moreover, it should have taken into account the interests of its neighbors, 
which included, not only Iran, but also Uzbekistan, Turkminastan, and Tajikistan. 
Similarly, no consideration was given to Russia's political influence over the Central 
Asian republics. Logically, Russia and Iran would never have let Central Asia or 
Afghanistan simply fall into Pakistan's lap.  
f. As related to the acquisition of a friendly government, maintaining a 
regime in Afghanistan who was also a client would have required monumental resources. 
It was not possible for Pakistan to afford such a task from its economy that was 
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dwindling in resources, itself. Moreover, the cost of reconstructing Afghanistan was 
conservatively estimated in 1998 to be approximately $ 40 Billion Dollar.159 This amount 
would be difficult to provide for even the wealthiest nations. 
g. Pakistan, instead of looking for political solutions, sought military 
solutions, first, through Hekmatyar, and then through the Taliban, each having a unique 
set of implications.160
h. When Afghanistan was under Soviet influence, a hostile Afghanistan 
mattered to Pakistan, and many of its external policies were influenced from Moscow. 
Pakistan’s fear of an Indo-Afghan-Soviet nexus was appeased by the collapse of the 
Soviet Empire. Therefore, there was a need to carry out a realistic re-orientation of 
Pakistan’s security concerns.  
2. Contributory Factors  
Although there were flaws in Pakistan’s Afghan policy, there were also a few 
other contributory factors, further complicating an already very complex situation for 
Pakistan.  
a. As discussed in Chapter III, the basic flaw was in the Geneva Accord, 
because it did not provide for the peaceful formation of a unified government for 
Afghanistan. As such, the Geneva Accord had the limited objective of getting the Soviets 
to withdraw from Afghanistan. The second flaw was that both superpowers continued 
their arms support to their proxies; had the arms support been allowed to dry up, the civil 
war could not have otherwise been prolonged.  
b. The collapse of the Soviet Union was a something that no one had 
visualized at that time. Consequently, the new independent states emerged with their own 
agenda and interests, thus creating a new situation in the region. 
c. Soon after the Soviet withdrawal from the region, the U.S. interests also 
vanished. The United States’ retreat from the region, combined with the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, created a power vacuum that could be filled by new actors in the region, 
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including Iran, CARs, Saudi Arabia, Russia, India and China. Entry of these new actors 
into the power game, along with their vested interests, further complicated the situation.  
d. Iran also contributed to the escalation of the crisis by fueling the war, 
while playing the “Shia card.”161 As a matter of fact, some analysts have concluded that 
Iran’s policy in Afghanistan has kept the pot boiling in Afghanistan so that it could gain 
control of land routes and pipelines to Central Asia.162
e. Initially, the United States also concurred with Pakistan’s policy, because 
it saw Afghanistan as a pressure point for Iran, but more so for its own economic interests 
in CAR’s oil resources. It changed its view only after Osama bin Laden landed in 
Afghanistan. The United States’ support to the Taliban emboldened Pakistan in its course 
of following its Taliban policy. 
3. Implications for Pakistan 
When a country opts to follow a certain foreign policy, it has its internal, as well 
as external, implications. These need to be kept under consideration while assessing the 
successes and failures of the policy. Similarly, Pakistan’s Afghan policy had far-reaching 
consequences for Pakistan’s own society. The impact on Pakistan of the Afghan crisis 
started after the Soviet invasion in 1979, and continues to cast its shadow, even today. 
The negative impacts of the Afghan crisis have left a deep impression on the socio-
cultural, political and economic landscapes of Pakistan.   
Since the Soviet Invasion, 3.2 million refugees have migrated to Pakistan. Despite 
the withdrawal of the Soviet Union, these refugees stayed in Pakistan due to the 
continuous civil war in Afghanistan. The presence of these refugees thus far has had deep 
social and economic impacts upon Pakistan. Not only did the Afghan refugees rupture the 
flimsy social fabric of Pakistan, but it also directly contributed to producing extremism, 
Jihaddi culture, violence, crime and corruption in the country. The religious fanaticism 
that emerged on the domestic scene in Pakistan in the early 1990s had not been seen in 
Pakistani society before. This trend was a direct result of militancy and sectarian 
violence, which kept creeping back into Pakistan’s society because of its support of the 
Afghan Mujahideen. Consequently, while Pakistani society became more radical in many 
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ways, it also became more conservative in its outlook on other religious matters. This 
trend gave rise to sectarian violence in the country.163   
Between 1979 and 1985, the number of heroin addicts in Pakistan grew from zero 
to 1.5 million. The drug menace, and the addictions it brought, started to gain a strong 
grip on Pakistani society; something it had not experienced before. Pakistan’s Afghan 
policy also adversely affected the Kashmir struggle movement, as it lost the world’s 
sympathy, due to Pakistani and Arab recruits joining the fight and turning to the Taliban 
Jihad.164 The Indians capitalized on this mood, defending their own atrocities in Kashmir, 
and a perfectly legitimate freedom struggle was branded as inspired by extremism and 
sponsoring terrorism.165
Another area where Pakistan was badly affected due to the Afghan crisis was in  
its economy. Due to rampant smuggling through the Afghan Transit Trade, Pakistan lost 
billions of rupees. Also, the Central Board of Revenue (CBR) estimated that Pakistan lost 
US $ 80 million in customs revenue in the financial year 1992/93, $ 280 Million Rupees 
in 1993/94, $ 600 million in 1997/98.166  
G.  CONCLUSION 
After the Soviet withdrawal, the Mujahideen became warlords, starting to seek 
personal power in a cut-throat competition against each other. Afghanistan’s continuous 
violence especially frustrated Pakistan, because it prevented the country from realizing its 
aspirations in both trade and influence in the Central Asia region. Pakistan, however, did 
try to bring some unity among Mujahideen groups, e.g., through the Peshawar and 
Islamabad accords, but failed to ensure compliance by either side. The failure of the 
Mujahideen to stop fighting amongst themselves led to the emergence of the Taliban. The 
Taliban brought about peace and tranquility, but their draconian measures and religious 
fundamentalism caused alarm and disappointment in the region and throughout the world 
at large. The dispute between the United States and the Taliban on the issues of terrorism  
163 Rashid, Taliban, 194. Rashid writes, “More than 1600 serious incidents were recorded between 
1987 and 1997, 478 persons were killed and some 2300 were injured. The year 1997 was the worst in 
which serious incidents were recorded claiming over 200 lives and 1998, which started was another year of 
worst sectarian violence and religious fanaticism”. 
164 Rashid, “Taliban: Exporting Terrorism” Foreign Affairs, 78, 6 (New York: Nov/Dec 1999), 22. 
available on http//gatewasy.proquest.com/openural?url_ver=Z39.88-2004, assessed on December 20, 2004. 
165 Asad Durani, “Taming the Taliban” The News, September 20, 1998. 
166 Rashid, Taliban, 190-192. 
63 
                                                
and Osama-bin-Laden, led to the imposition of sanctions on Kabul. The terrorist attacks 
of September 11, 2001 on the Unites States., combined with the Taliban’s refusal to hand 
over Osama-bin-Laden, led to the U.S. military action in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, 
and led to the ultimate collapse of the Taliban regime. For Pakistan, joining the US-led 
coalition against international terrorism reflected a major policy shift towards 
Afghanistan. 
The failure of Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy during this period can be attributed 
to a number of factors. The major flaw was in the Geneva Accord, which had limited 
agenda of ensuring withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. It did not provide a 
framework for the establishment of an interim government after the Soviet withdrawal. 
Moreover, the Geneva Accord did not bring an end to the arms supply of both 
superpowers to their respective parties. As a result, armed conformation between the 
Kabul regime and the Mujahideen continued. The shortsightedness of U.S. policy 
allowed communist Afghans to retain power in Afghanistan, despite the Soviet 
withdrawal. Subsequently, the emergence of CARs states, as a result of the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, further complicated the situation. With both superpowers gone from the 
region, new actors exploited the situation for their own vested interests, thereby fueling 
the ongoing civil war in Afghanistan.  
In retrospect, one observes that during this period Pakistan also did not form a 
coherent foreign policy with which it could handle the Afghan situation appropriately. 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) and Ministry of Interior, 
each made independent decisions; decisions which they thought were in the interests of 
the country. One of the causes that contributed in its failure to form any long-term, 
coherent response to the Afghan crisis was Pakistan’s internal political instability. 
Moreover, unlike Pakistan’s previous Afghanistan policy, two factors stand out as 
distinctively different during the period under discussion. First, Pakistani policy-makers 
considered it to be their legitimate right to install a pro-Pakistani government in Kabul, as 
a prize for having supported the Afghan cause during the war against the Soviet’s.167 
Second, with the emergence of CARs, Pakistan’s objectives in Afghanistan were not only 
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limited to strengthening its own security, but now economic interests also figured 
prominently. Because Pakistan was obsessed with accomplishing these desires, getting 
overly entangled in the internal political crisis of Afghanistan, in the end it proved 



























Until September 11, 2001, Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy was in disarray. 
Although Pakistan has changed its policy, there persists a certain kind of inertia. The 
Taliban have been routed, but some elements continue to operate in a “gray area,” in the 
porous tribal region, on the border. Similarly, some elements in the Afghan government 
continue to remain hostile to Pakistan. Afghanistan is gradually returning to normalcy, 
but it is still years away from becoming a coherent nation-state. At present, the strong 
presence of coaltion forces has given some semblance of stability to Afghanistan, both in 
its military and in its political spheres. Pakistan’s role in Afghan affairs is minimal, 
although it continues to be the economic lifeline of landlocked Afghanistan. The 
entrenched, erstwhile Northern Alliance (comprised of Tajiks and Uzbeks) remain both 
powerful and hostile towards Pakistan. In view of regional and global changes, there is a 
need to review Pakistan’s policy towards Afghanistan. The salient question is, “What 
policy options may exist for Pakistan towards Afghanistan at the present time?”   
As Pakistan reviews its long-term strategic policy, it must take into account 
dynamic changes in the global and regional environment. Pakistan needs to develop a 
link between its Afghan policy and the prevalent situations at the regional and global 
levels. At the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, tensions continue to mount and it appears that 
the ongoing chill between the countries might last awhile.168 However, there are 
powerful elements that could prevent a total breakdown of the bilateral relations, such as, 
ethno-linguistic affinity, commonality of cultural and religious traditions, positive 
refugee experiences, and economic interdependency. Policy-makers on both sides should 
be cognizant of these factors while framing policies.  
Given the course of analysis, and the likely political disposition in Afghanistan, as 
well as its potential effect on Pakistan, the formulation of any Pakistan-Afghanistan 
policy should arise out of the strategies of influence in state-to-state relations, such as a 
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policy of reassurance.169 Within the broader framework of policy of reassurance, a 
“Policy of Constructive Bilateral Engagement”170 is a recommended mode of discourse. 
This chapter begins by describing the present geopolitical environment in 
Afghanistan, followed by a deliberation upon the factors that have the potential to affect 
Pakistan’s Afghanistan relations in a positive way. Before policy recommendations are 
given, the current factors in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations will be discussed.   
B AFGHANISTAN’S PRESENT GEO-STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 
For the sake of brevity, only the broadest conclusions with regard to the analysis 
of the present geo-strategic environment in Afghanistan will be discussed. These 
conclusions are given to demonstrate the conditions in the formation of any policy.  
1. Afghanistan’s Internal Situation 
Afghan society remains deeply divided along predominantly ethnic lines, where 
religion is often used to compliment one group’s feelings of ethnic superiority over other 
groups, e.g., in a group’s claiming to be better Muslims.171 Even the struggle against the 
Soviet occupation was, at heart, an ethnic struggle, with various tribes outdoing others to 
claim national superiority (and, therefore, demanding a bigger slice of the aid “pie”). This 
phenomenon, along with fear of Pushtun domination felt by some in the Northern 
Alliance, led to the opposition of the Taliban Islamic Militia. It is envisaged that 
Afghanistan is not likely to emerge as a single, ethno-political unit in near future.   
The law and order situation in Afghanistan is likely to remain a source of worry 
for the United States and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Such 
concerns are due to the ethnic polarization of the society, and the inability of the ISAF to 
win Afghan’s acceptance easily. As long as non-Pushtun elements, dominated by the 
Panjsheri Tajik elite, continue to assert their new-found political power in an attempt to 
marginalize the Pushtun majority, there will be reciprocal actions by the Pushtuns. Only 
the successful formulation of a government could avoid a potential of ethnic conflict. 
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171 For the details of the phenomenon of militias and their role in Afghanistan see Antonio Giustozzi, 
War, Politics and Society in Afghanistan 1978-1992 (London: Hurst & Co., 2000), 198-225.  
67 
                                                
Moreover, reformed Taliban members will have to be re-integrated into the state 
structure, as their continued marginalization is likely to be counter-productive, for ethnic 
and political reasons.  
At present, for many Afghans, the most immediate issue is personal security and 
their main concern, for now, is to survive under war-like conditions.172 As long as 
contending powers and adjacent states seek their own subjective aims in Afghanistan, 
internal instability in Afghanistan will likely persist. 
2. The Global and Regional Scenario 
 Afghanistan will remain in the lime light due to the ongoing war on terrorism.  
Major players—i.e., the United States, Russia, India, Iran, and the entire Islamic world-- 
will remain involved in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future. Another point of interest 
that will keep Afghanistan relevant to the international community is the proximity of 
Afghanistan to several of the largest hydrocarbon reserves in the Caspian Region. The 
prospects of the Caspian Region might, therefore, continue to affect the foreign policies 
of all regional countries, like Pakistan, Iran, India, China, and Russia, as well as other 
interested stake-holders, like the United States, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Thus, these 
players may continue to affect the Afghan situation, either directly or indirectly.  
While commenting on some of the important player’s policies, vis-à-vis 
Afghanistan, it is envisaged that Russia will apparently continue to follow a hands-off 
policy in Afghanistan, at least as long as the United States remains militarily committed 
to the region. Another reason this policy might continue is that the Russian buffer zone, 
in the form of its former CARs, is not threatened, and its economic interests are not 
endangered by the Coalition’s operations in Afghanistan. China, while committed to 
domestic economic development and internal reform, will likely watch the situation from 
the sidelines. The Chinese are already flooding the Afghan market with their 
merchandise. Similarly, India will likely continue to exert its traditional influence on 
Afghan affairs. India’s strategic interest is to tie down substantial Pakistani military 
forces along the Pak-Afghan border. Presently, India is heavily investing in the 
reconstruction of Afghanistan. To demonstrate its assistance, it is spending millions of 
 
172 Michael O’ Hanlon, “Afghanistan Index: Tracking variables of Reconstruction and Security in 
Post-Taliban Afghanistan” (The Brookings Institution; Washington DC, May 19, 2005), available on line, 
www.brookings.edu/afghanistanindex.,   assessed on July 1, 2005.  
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dollars in various projects as a goodwill gesture.173  But, a large embassy in Kabul, and 
proliferating consulates in Kandhar, Heart and Jalalabad are busy cultivating relations 
with important military commanders, who operate close to the Pakistani border.174 This, 
of course, is a source of anxiety in Pakistan, since not too long ago this area was in 
Pakistan’s backyard. Two other important actors, i.e., Iran and Pakistan, are likely to 
jockey for influence through proxies to benefit from the riches of Central Asia. The re-
emergence of Pakistani leverage is dependent upon the political disposition after the 
Afghanistan’s parliament elections, assuming that the election rectifies the on-going 
ethnic tensions. 
C. CONVERGING FACTORS IN PAKISTAN-AFGHANSITAN RELATIONS 
Notwithstanding the issues of Durand Line and Pushtunistan, there are number of 
factors which affect Pakistan and Afghanistan relations in a positive way.175 These 
factors can not be wished away by any government in Afghanistan. These could be 
termed as converging factors in Pakistan’s-Afghanistan relations, which have had the 
centrifugal pull to keep both countries closer to each other. The policy-makers in Pakistan 
are to keep these things in mind while formulating Afghanistan policy. 
 1. Economy. Being land-locked, Afghanistan, for trade, relies on the port of 
Karachi for the majority of its imports and exports. This has traditionally been the 
greatest point of leverage with Pakistani authorities whenever Afghanistan has created 
trouble on the border, or raised the issue of Pushtunistan. The Afghan business class has a 
considerable stake in re-exporting/smuggling items imported through this arrangement 
back into Pakistan. Moreover, Pakistani currency is freely exchangeable anywhere in 
Afghanistan. Wheat, edible oil and petroleum products are imported exclusively from 
Pakistan, and the NWFP government, generally, includes the Afghan wheat requirements 
 
173 Statement by Mr. V.K. Namber, Permanent representative, on the Situation in Afghanistan at the 
Security Council on April 6, 2004.  http://www.un.int/india/ind910.pdf, assessed on April 20, 2005. 
174 Rahimullah Yousafzai, “Pakistan’s Loss in Afghanistan is India’s Gain” in The News, July 13, 
2003.  
 175 Inam ul Haque. Afghanistan Crisis–Challenges for South Asia, Research Paper, National Defense 
College, 2003-04. I agree with the opinion of the author and share the similar views.  
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in its provincial forecasts. Most Afghan men have, traditionally, sought temporary 
employment in Pakistan during winters, especially in the NWFP.176  
2. The Welfare of Refugees. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 3.5 
million refugees entered Pakistan. Despite not being a signatory to the Geneva 
Convention on Refugees (of 1951), Pakistan was actively involved in the rehabilitation of 
refugees. Consequently, the Afghan Refugee Commissionerate was established for the 
welfare and rehabilitation of the refugees.177 While in Pakistan, refugees have been 
provided healthcare, education, including vocational training to females, and employment 
opportunities, besides being provided a host of other facilities. Notwithstanding the 
negative social implications, and the recurring maintenance costs associated with these 
refugees, perhaps the biggest Pakistani benefit would be young Afghans who better 
understand the significance of their lives in Pakistan. They grew up in Pakistan, and have 
been well-educated in Pakistani schools, colleges and universities.178 They are the 
sources of “soft power” for Pakistan on Afghanistan. 
3. Religion. Traditionally, the Afghan clergy have looked towards the 
subcontinent for their religious education. Deoband, in India, was taken over by the 
Darul Ulum Haqqania in Akora Khattak, near Nowshera. As a result, Darul Ulum 
Haqqania is the alma mater of most Afghani scholars. There are many Afghan mullahs, 
acting as imams in mosques of the NWFP. Religious affinity, strengthened by ethnic 
bonds, provides the strongest bond between Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
4. Cultural & Ethnic Affinity. Perhaps the strongest binding force which 
binds the populace on both sides of the border is ethnic commonality. In fact, most 
Pakistanis consider themselves émigrés from Afghanistan, or some other part of Central 
Asia.179 The ethnic identity of the major ethnic group, i.e. Pushtuns, is based upon a 
complex mix of various factors, such as history, language, the commonality of racial 
 
176 Daily, The News, December 8, 2003. The paper while referring to President Karzai reports that, 
“At present there are some 30,000 Pakistani workers engaged in the Afghan reconstruction with 10,000 as 
carpenters only”. 
177 Daily, The Pakistan Times, Lahore, January 19, 1985.   
178 Daily, The News, September 1, 1998, 5. The paper reports, “By 1998, five universities names Syed 
Jamaluddin Afghani University, Ahmed Shah Abdali University, Hewad University, Ummatul Momineen 
University of Women and Islamic Pohantoon were operating in Peshawar alone not to mention the scores 
of schools & colleges”  
179 For a fulsome account on genealogy see Caroe, The Pathans,3-24. 
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stock and traditions. Despite the existence of the Durand Line, there is no government-
imposed restriction on the movement across the Line. Therefore, tribes on both sides still 
engage in travel and trade. Whereas the majority of Pushtuns find assimilation on either 
side unproblematic, their orientation has remained strongly towards Pakistan. Now, given 
the current situation, this free movement is part of the problem. Movement across the 
borders, hitherto soft, has now to be regulated and controlled. 
D. CURRENT FACTORS IN PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN RELATIONS 
The geo-strategic compulsions defined above, can be termed as constants that can 
not be ignored by any Afghan government that is either friendly, or unfriendly, towards 
Pakistan. This section will now identify and analyze the situational variables that might 
help better define Pakistan’s policy towards Afghanistan. 
1. Terrorism   
Since the United States bombing of Afghanistan, Pushtuns, being the supporters 
of the Taliban movement, are the main target of the Northern Alliance. Until the 
elections, the Northern Alliance was successful in preventing Pushtuns from sharing any 
political role in the country. However, there is a growing realization, among all involved, 
that exclusion of the majority Pushtuns from the political process for any longer would be 
counter-productive to the peace and stability of Afghanistan. Therefore, there is a need 
for an early détente with a people who have been politically marginalized based on bias 
and ethnic opposition. Moreover, the issue of Arab and other foreign fighters using 
Afghani or Pakistani soil for their campaign against the West has been a source of 
concern for both countries, especially for Pakistan. Pakistan needs to remain committed 
in its fight against terrorism, as a resurgence of terrorism is likely to have grave 
destabilization consequences over the entire region.  
For the success of the war against terrorism, as well as the need to address the 
Pushtun Taliban sense of deprivation/alienation, while discouraging the use of Pakistani 
soil as a staging ground for attacks inside Afghanistan, both countries would need to 
engage in more positive and solution-oriented cooperation, rather than negative rhetoric 




                                                
2. Economic Dimension – The Route to Central Asia 
A lot has been written about the prospective exploitation of the energy reserves of  
Central Asia through Afghanistan and on to the Pakistani port of Gwadar. There has, 
especially, been a focus on pipeline politics, a subject addressed below.   
Initially, Azerbaijan was considered to be practicable area of oil and gas reserves 
in Central Asia, due to its proximity to the Mediterranean Sea and Europe. The options 
considered by Unocal of the Unites States, and Delta Oil of Saudi Arabia included the 
existing transit routes through Russia and the prospective route through Turkey (Baku-
Djeihan-Ceyhan). Russian unwillingness to allow transport of CARs oil at the cost of its 
own oil exports made the first alternative less attractive. Therefore, the Turkish route was 
adopted, after problems in Armenia were settled. Later, proposals were made to link the 
Turkmenistan reserves to Baku through a pipeline under the Caspian Sea. However, this 
project would be both costly and time consuming. Uzbekistan faces a similar problem, 
due to the location of its reserves and, therefore, remains interested in working out 
projects oriented towards Pakistan through Afghanistan or Iran.   
One of the obvious contenders in this game is Iran. But Iran, due to its cold 
relations with the West, and in particular, with the United States, on the nuclear issue, is 
presently not in any position to influence decision making in Afghanistan. The Pakistani 
option, besides the prospect of providing international exports, is considered to be more 
promising for the rapidly expanding, power hungry Indian market. However, the 
proposed project, called the “Trans-Afghan Pipeline,” going from the Daulatabad gas 
fields in Turkmenistan to Multan/Gwadar, through Afghanistan, is feasible even without 
India, as the growing Pakistani domestic market makes it a profitable venture.180 Thus, 
Pakistan is actively developing a deep-sea port in Gwadar with Chinese assistance, and is 




180 “Trans-Afghan Pipeline feasible despite India’s Obduracy” in the Daily The News, July 4, 2003. 
{The gas pipeline is approximately 1270 kms long with the potential of carrying 20 billion cubic feet of gas 
a year.  The construction of project is valued at US $ 2 billion.  The oil pipeline is 1900 kms and is priced 
at US $ 8 billion. The economic prospects are substantiated by facts that the farthest capital i.e.  Almaty 
(Kazakhstan) is only 1040 kms from Islamabad,  while the distances to other ports are much more than 
this} 
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3. The United States’ Presence in Afghanistan 
The last element that continues to define Pakistan’s policy framework is the 
Unites States presence in Afghanistan, as well as in Pakistan.   
The United States’ interests in Afghanistan have been curtailment of Islamic 
extremism, improvement in human rights and the economy. In its war against terrorism, 
hunting down Osama bin Laden and rooting out Al-Qaeda is the primary goal of the 
United States. Although, the status of this theater became secondary since the Iraq war 
came to the fore, to achieve its objectives, the United States, is compelled to maintain a 
sizable strength in the Arabian Sea. The cumulative effect of these extra-regional forces, 
in and outside Afghanistan, serve to limit Pakistan’s freedom of action in Afghanistan. 
Pakistan’s partnership in the war against terrorism has helped Pakistan retain some 
influence. Consequently, the United States’ presence provides a window of opportunity 
for Pakistan to resolve the issue of border with Afghanistan.  
With the above reference points serving as the basis, an objective appraisal of the 
policy options of both countries will be discussed in the following paragraphs. 
E. AFGHANISTAN’S POLICY OPTIONS 
As a matter of fact, any policy formulated at Kabul will likely be ineffectual 
without total implementation by all the organs of the state. The last 25 years of war have 
seriously damaged state institutions, infrastructure and the society, as a whole. It will take 
some time before the institutions are functioning normally and a trained administration is 
in place. In view of the fragmented state of Afghanistan, it will also take sometime for a 
coherent policy to emerge. In the immediate future, the majority of Afghan leaders will 
likely try to contain any Pakistani influence, due to their recent experience with the 
Taliban. Afghan rulers are likely to expand their dependence to countries other than 
Pakistan, such as Iran and India. The possible nexus of Iran, India and Afghanistan will 
be seen as strategic envelopment by Pakistan. As always, Pakistan is wary of any 
involvement of India in Afghanistan affairs. Left unchecked, such developments will lead 
to resurfacing of irritants, like Pushtunistan, the Durand Line issue and cross border 
movements.  
Afghanistan will do well if it finds that war against terrorism is in the mutual 
interest of both Pakistan and Afghanistan. This also implies that both countries must have 
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cooperative policies towards the U.S.’ efforts against terrorism in the region. This 
obvious benefit will derail if interference in Afghanistan from India and Iran is not 
curtailed. Pakistan will react by using its clout in the tribal region, should it find that 
outside countries are causing malfeasance in sensitive border areas of Pakistan.  
However, for now, rapprochement between Pakistan and Afghanistan is likely to 
continue, as the broad-based, ethnically balanced Afghan government gains control after 
the 2005 parliamentary elections. The full effects of this policy are not likely to be visible 
before at least one more elections, and until the time all Pushtun refugees can be 
motivated to return. 
F. PAKISTAN’S POLICY OPTIONS  
After establishing the current geo-political environment of the region, and with 
the analysis of the variable parameters that have traditionally influenced Pakistan’s 
Afghan policy options (and continue to do so), it is possible to discern the conceptual 
contours of the policy to be followed. This section will identify such contours, while 
offering certain recommendations.  
At the moment, Pakistan and Afghanistan relations are following a very delicate 
course. Misperceptions about each other’s motives and/or intentions are high. Pakistan 
has to be careful in selecting policy options. There are two courses which can be adopted 
by Pakistan as influencing strategies; one is Coercive Diplomacy, and the other is a 
Policy of Reassurance. It is pertinent to briefly discuss both of these policies, while 
drawing conclusions about their efficacy, and offering guidelines for policy-makers.  
1. Coercive Diplomacy 
Coercive diplomacy is a form of compelling another to act in a certain way, and 
should be distinguished from war. Coercive diplomacy has two hallmarks used to change 
an opponent’s behavior: threaten use of force or actually use limited force; and use other 
means such as diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions. However, coercive 
diplomacy is not an easy strategy to successfully implement. Evidence from several case 
studies suggests that success in calibrating the use of force and diplomacy has been very 
limited.181 Data reveals that the success rate of coercive diplomacy over the years may be 
 
181 For a detailed study see Robert J Art and Kenneth Waltz, eds. “ The Use of Force: Military Power 
and International Politics” ( Maryland: Rowman & Little Field Publishing Group), sixth edition, 2003. 
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less than 30%. Such data provides good, theoretical reasons as to why coercive 
diplomacy is not an effective a tool in all the situations.182
Statistics related to the use of coercive diplomacy with regard to Afghanistan are 
not different from other places, rather, one finds that Afghanistan has been more resistant 
to coercion than some nations have been (especially when used militarily). For example, 
Pakistan’s economic blockade of Afghanistan during the 1960s, the United States’ cruise 
missile attack against Osama Bin Laden’s hideout in 1998, economic sanctions against 
the Taliban regime from 1998 to 2001, and, finally, the failure of coercive diplomacy 
after 9/11 are cases in point.    
If adopting such a policy, Pakistan would have two points of leverage available to 
them to exert pressure on Kabul. One is economic, and the second is military. The 
military option would appear to be out for now, since Pakistan has already suffered a 
great deal as a political consequence of military strategies.183 The only option, then, 
appears to be economic. As discussed earlier, Afghanistan is a land-locked country. 
Therefore, Pakistan can deny Afghanistan port facilities, thereby, adversely affecting its 
economy. Moreover, Afghanistan’s population is heavily dependent upon Pakistan for the 
import of wheat, rice, grains, etc. Thus, Pakistan can restrict the export of such 
commodities to Afghanistan, which would affect the population and, in turn, the 
government. Two points needs to be kept under consideration while pursuing this option: 
First, any economic sanctions applied against Afghanistan would affect the Afghan 
population, directly, and would likely have negative fall-out, perhaps in the form of 
domestic resistance to this policy in Pakistan. Second, as Pakistan’s own economy does 
not have the resilience of its own, it would probably be adversely affected, due to a loss 
of revenue. That means the cost of such policy might exceed any possible gains. 
Therefore, coercive diplomacy, in any form, will be counter-productive to Pakistan’s own 




182 Art, “Coercive Diplomacy”  
183 See chapter 4, and for theoretical details see Charles L. Glaser “Political Consequences of Military 
Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Model” in World Politics, Vol 44, No 4. (July 
1992) 
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2. Policy of Reassurance  
Because coercive diplomacy as a strategy may be too ineffective and risky, 
diplomacy might best be mixed within a broader context of other strategies for conflict 
management. These strategies are often grouped together under the rubric of 
“reassurance,” and can complement coercive diplomacy by helping to reduce uncertainty 
and miscalculation, often endemic to adversarial relationships. These may be more useful 
when leaders are heavily constrained by political weakness, or when there is pressure 
from more than one source. Reassurance measures are likely to be more relevant to 
conflict situations, propelled by mutual hostility and mistrust, than they are to those 
situations that are largely issue-driven.184 Historical and comparative research suggests 
that strategies of reassurance can restrain the development of informal means of 
competition. Thus, irrevocable commitments can help to reassure a vulnerable adversary, 
reduce the likelihood of miscalculations, and create alternatives to the use of force.185  
Stein points out the applicability conditions for the success of strategy of 
assurance when he writes, “Strategies of reassurance are most likely to succeed with an 
adversary who is concerned largely about its own security and does not seek primarily to 
exploit.”186  For the successful implementation of the strategy, the state must overcome 
strategic, political, and psychological obstacles. Cognitive barriers can easily give wrong 
signals. Therefore, it is important that while implementing reassurance strategy, the target 
state should be assured that its weaknesses will not be exploited and that the state does 
not pose a threat.187  
With regard to Afghanistan, twenty years of war has completely crippled its 
economy. It would take another two decades for Afghanistan to play any meaningful role 
in the world’s politics. Afghanistan is an ethnically divided country, and thus can, easily 
be exploited by outside actors. The general election held in 2004 brought an elected 
government, but to bring unity in a traditionally fractured country is a long process. The 
government of Karzai needs security and reassurance from outside actors for help to 
stabilize his regime. Pakistani policy-makers can help by appreciating this requirement, 
 
184 For detail see Stein, “Deterrence and Reassurance: Behavior, Society and Nuclear War”, 32. 
185 Ibid., 58. 
186 Ibid., 34. 
187 Jeff Knoff, Class notes NS4669, “Conflict and Cooperation in World Politics.” March 2, 2005. 
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and by adopting policies that helps develop trust. Afghan leaders need to be reassured 
that Pakistan is sincere in restoring peace and stability in Afghanistan.  
Given the course of this analysis, and the likely political dispensation in 
Afghanistan, and their potential effects on Pakistan, the “Policy of Constructive Bilateral 
Engagement” is recommended as a strategy of reassurance.188 Under this policy, Pakistan 
should remain effectively engaged at all levels in Afghan affairs, protect its legitimate 
interests and avoid leaving a vacuum. This involves targeting a whole range of domestic 
actors, civil society groups and the governments. The recommended measures include all 
possible and visible assistance in education, healthcare, industry, banking and defense 
sectors. The obstructive, and at times offensive, Afghan rhetoric must be ignored, and 
over-reaction should be avoided to facilitate maintaining this aim.189 Pakistan’s own 
leverage, in various forms, should be strengthened, and efforts made to understand 
Afghan sociology (by incorporating informed/expert input into policy formulation). 
G. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1.  Diplomacy plays a key role in the foreign policies of states and other 
international actors. This is the most cost effective of foreign policy tools.190 Diplomacy 
is, basically, an art of communication and is a specialized field. In the past, Pakistan gave 
scant attention to this all-important tool of relations with its errant neighbor and in 
achieving its policy objectives in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s Afghan policy was largely 
determined by the ISI and, therefore, the role of the Pakistan Army and ISI should be 
minimized in the future. The responsibility of policy formulation and implementation 
should be shifted back to the Foreign Office. Moreover, to ensure transparency, non-
confidential matters of policy should be debated in the parliament for the sake of political 
credibility. Additionally, the opinions of sociologists, anthropologists and political 
scientists should be sought while recommending response options to the government.  
 
188 Hass, “Honey and Vinegar” 
189 Ibid., For details as to how engagement strategies be implemented.   
190 Brian White, “Diplomacy”, in The Globalization of World Politics, (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2001), 329. 
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2. Pakistan has genuine concerns over Afghanistan’s internal instability, 
because it has a direct impact on Pakistan, itself.191 However, Pakistan should refrain 
from interfering in Afghanistan's internal matters and avoid engineering the political 
shape of Afghanistan. Pakistan may foster relations with saner elements of the Northern 
Alliance, but without playing favorites. 
3. Pakistan’s government should continue to advise the United States about 
the pitfalls of branding the entire Pushtun population as “the Taliban.” Not all Taliban 
members are Al-Qaeda operatives. The Taliban are also Pushtuns and are integral to 
Afghanistan. To integrate the Taliban into the system, constructive engagement with the 
moderate members of the Taliban should be ensured through the religious establishment 
in Pakistan.   
4. The Afghan government must be continuously apprised of the negative 
security implications of the Indian presence in Afghanistan in large numbers. It must be 
emphasized that a deteriorating security situation in Pakistan is also to the detriment of 
Afghanistan, due to the potential of the violence spilling-over Pakistan’s borders. Finally, 
Pakistan must actively seek collaboration with Iran, and other Central Asian states on 
Afghanistan.192 With India, since a dialogue and peace process is under way, Pakistan 
should also put on its agenda and express its apprehension about India’s involvement in 
Afghanistan. 
5. Pakistan has the potential of playing a pivotal role in the reconstruction of 
Afghanistan. In this regard, all possible and visible assistance in areas such as, education, 
healthcare, industry, banking and defense, should be provided for Afghanistan’s 
reconstruction. Pakistan should also actively participate in the reconstruction efforts of 
Afghanistan in accordance with the priorities of the Afghan government. By planning its 
own economy to fit the needs of a reviving Afghanistan, Pakistan stands to profit 
 
191 Marvin Weinbaum, “U.S. involvement in Afghanistan since 9/11”. Paper presented by Weinbaum 
in two days workshop on Afghanistan organized by International Relations Department of the University of 
Karachi. Weinbaum said "If Afghanistan fails; Pakistan will be in trouble as there will be revival of 
extremism having enormous implications for the entire region". Available on line 
http://www.dawn.com/2005/03/04/local41.htm, assessed on April 15, 2005. 
192 The strategic significance of the region is clear from the fact that India has the only military base 
outside India in Tajikistan. India helped the regional countries, especially Tajikistan, against the onslaught 
of the Taliban by supporting the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. See in “Central Asia, new focus of 
India's oil diplomacy” in The Hindustan Times, available on line, 
http://www.hindustantimes.com/news/181_1308782,0002.htm, assessed on April 15, 2005. 
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handsomely. Investment in certain sectors and industries (e.g., transport and cement) 
would have a particular payoff. At the same time, Pakistan provides Afghanistan with a 
potential market for certain higher-value agricultural commodities and possibly cheap 
electrical power. Additionally, early stabilization of Afghanistan will be helpful in the 
repatriation of the Afghan refugees from Pakistan and, thereby, significantly alleviate the 
burden on Pakistan's economy. 
H. SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE UNITED STATES 
The United States, while learning its lessons from past mistakes of abandoning 
Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal, needs to remain actively committed, until a 
broad based stable government is established in Kabul, having proportional 
representation by all the ethnic groups. Moreover, the efforts need to be directed to 
extend the control of the center to the periphery, so that law and order is achieved by the 
government, and not by the tribal leaders. Additionally, sufficient funds for the 
reconstruction of the country should be provided and routed through the center to the 
tribal leaders/governors, to increase their dependency on Kabul.  
The United States and Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan are now reasonably well 
linked, particularly in the war against terrorism. Pakistan is, undeniably, the most 
important country in the region, and Washington's relationship with Islamabad is the 
chief determining factor in what happens to Afghanistan. Therefore, the United States 
should accommodate Pakistan’s concerns in Afghanistan especially vis-à-vis India, and, 
most importantly it must help to resolve the issue of Durand Line between Pakistan and 
Afghanistan, once and for all.    
I. CONCLUSION 
The September 11 incident has provided Pakistan with an opportunity to 
reconsider its Afghanistan policy, and regain its lost status in the international 
community. The present ongoing cold relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan will 
remain for some time. But if the two countries continue to improve relations and allay 
misperceptions, it is likely to improve. The historical, geographical and cultural 
interdependence between Pakistan and Afghanistan is bound to play its role in 
strengthening the relations between the two countries. Similarly, there are factors that 
will affect Pakistan’s Afghanistan relations. Issues, such as the Durand Line and 
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Pushtunistan questions, the war on terrorism, the hostile involvement of India and Iran 
against Pakistan may be contentious ones and pose difficulties. Yet, trade with the 
Central Asian Republics, energy pipelines, and the United States presence in Afghanistan 
are positive factors that are harbingers of a new era of peace and harmony in the region.   
The futures of Pakistan and Afghanistan are linked. The analytical framework 
suggests options for both countries to pursue certain polices. For Afghanistan, it is hoped 
that the present regime will pursue a friendly policy towards Pakistan. It must realize 
Pakistani concerns identified above and expect pragmatic accommodation and cordiality 
in the future from Pakistan. A stable, broad-based government in Afghanistan for at least 
next two terms will give sufficient sustainability to Pakistan-Afghanistan relations.  
Pakistan, for its part, must constructively engage Afghanistan, at all levels. This is 
the only way to ensure, retain and enhance Pakistan’s leverage with regard to 
Afghanistan. Afghanistan is too important for Pakistan to ignore and Pakistan cannot 
follow a hands-off policy. However, Pakistan needs to avoid a “hands-on” policy as well. 
The policy formulation and implementation should be done by the foreign office, and 
must have input from eminent “Afghanologists.” Pakistan’s investment in Afghanistan is 
considered to be too heavy, and too critical to be wasted. Pakistan has a great stake in the 
emergence of a stable, prosperous and friendly Afghanistan. Long-term instability in 
Afghanistan could put great strain on Pakistan’s economy and society, and carry 
implications for its national security. Therefore, it needs a strategic vision in terms of 
devising a long-term Afghan policy consistent with its national interests. Pakistan must 
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APPENDIX   
U.N. RESOLUTION OF 1980 
 
The resolution was based on the following four principles: 
 
1. Preservation of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and 
non-aligned character of Afghanistan.  
2. The right of the Afghan people to determine their own form of government and 
freely choose their own political, economic and social systems. 
3. Immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan. 
4. Creation of the necessary conditions to enable the Afghan refugees to return 




The Geneva Accord consisted of four instruments: 
 
1. Instrument one was signed between Pakistan and Afghanistan. This pertained to 
the principles of mutual relations, in particular, emphasizing non-interference in each 
other’s internal affairs.  
2. Instrument two was signed between the USA and USSR and guaranteed that there 
would be no intervention and interference by them in the internal affairs of the high 
contracting parties. 
3. Instrument three was signed between Pakistan and Afghanistan and concerned the 
voluntary return of refugees. This was a vital element from Pakistan, but it would only 
come into effect if the proper environment prevailed in Afghanistan.  
4. Instrument four was signed between Afghanistan and the USSR, specifying a time 
frame for the withdrawal of Soviet troops. The reduction was to commence on May 15th 
of the same year. The withdrawal was to be completed in 9 months, with one half leaving 
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